The Impact of the American Invasion of Grenada on Anglo-American Relations and the Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Britain by Anglea, Timothy
Clemson University
TigerPrints
All Theses Theses
5-2014
The Impact of the American Invasion of Grenada
on Anglo-American Relations and the Deployment
of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Britain
Timothy Anglea
Clemson University, tanglea@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the European History Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anglea, Timothy, "The Impact of the American Invasion of Grenada on Anglo-American Relations and the Deployment of
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Britain" (2014). All Theses. 1979.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/1979
THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN INVASION OF GRENADA ON ANGLO-
AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE 
NUCLEAR FORCES IN BRITAIN 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
the Graduate School of 
Clemson University 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
History  
 
 
by 
Timothy Robert Anglea 
May 2014 
 
 
Accepted by: 
Dr. Michael Silvestri, Committee Chair 
Dr. Stephanie Barczewski 
Dr. Edwin Moise 
 
  
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis studies the impact the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 had on 
Anglo-American relations and the deployment of cruise missiles in Britain.  Anglo-
American nuclear relations were dependent on a strong level of trust between the two 
governments.  The deception employed by President Reagan’s government in concealing 
American intentions concerning Grenada from the British government broke that trust.  
The American invasion also furthered doubts held by the general British population 
concerning the placement of American owned and operated cruise missiles on British 
soil.  The deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces in Britain and Western 
Europe was crucial to Prime Minister Thatcher’s foreign policy objectives.  The 
American invasion of Grenada imperiled the deployment of INF and demonstrated 
profound differences in how President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher viewed the 
Anglo-American alliance and foreign policy in general.  Ultimately, the Grenada affair 
provides an opportunity to study Britain’s ability to maintain an independent foreign 
policy in the superpower era as well as Margaret Thatcher’s reliance on internationalism 
and alliance-building in achieving her foreign policy objectives. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the start of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership in 1979, Britain faced serious 
questions on whether it would be an Atlantic or a European power.  Britain’s foreign 
policy objectives, however, remained largely consistent.  While Thatcher broke the 
decades-old practice of consensus domestic politics in Britain by scaling back the welfare 
state, privatizing public companies, and closing collieries, her foreign policy reflected a 
continuation of the policies developed by both postwar Labour and Tory governments.  
For Thatcher, as for other postwar Prime Ministers, a strong relationship with the United 
States designed to enhance Britain’s global and European influence remained of 
paramount importance.  However, at the same time she sought to infuse a greater sense of 
nationalism and renewed British greatness into her foreign policy as well.  Thatcher 
continued to rely on a strong, united NATO to maintain Britain’s security interests, but 
avoided greater political integration with Europe.  However, a serious threat existed 
during the 1980s of a potential split in the western alliance due to changes in left-leaning 
political parties and changes in public perceptions of the United States throughout Britain 
and Western Europe.  The question of America’s reliability and trustworthiness as a 
guarantor of safety hugely impacted Thatcher’s foreign policy.  Without the US, her 
defensive and diplomatic goals could not be met or implemented properly.  The 
American invasion of Grenada in 1983 thus heightened the potential danger to both the 
western alliance and Thatcher’s government. 
In Thatcher’s Diplomacy (1997), political scientist Paul Sharp praises the Prime 
Minister’s ability to maintain an independent foreign policy in an era of decreasing 
national sovereignty.  Sharp decries the lack of emphasis on Thatcher’s foreign as 
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opposed to her domestic policy.  He believes Thatcher should be regarded “as an 
international statesman, someone who has had a decisive impact, not merely on the 
foreign policy of her own country, but on the conduct of international affairs in general.”1  
At the beginning of her premiership, Britain faced stark challenges both domestically and 
internationally, and “Britain’s activity and influence in the ‘three circles’ of world power 
– the Anglo-American relationship, the empire-Commonwealth, and Europe – were 
possibly more limited and more contingent on circumstances than they had ever been.”2  
Faced with such problems, Thatcher maintained a largely independent foreign policy 
through strong alliance-building and maintenance.  Sharp believes Thatcher based her 
foreign policy on a “combination of political nationalism and economic liberalism [i.e. 
free trade, deregulated industry, privatization].”3  Contemporary political thought pointed 
to the gradual relinquishment of political independence to supranational agencies like the 
Eastern Bloc and EEC.  Political scientists argued at the time that “to maintain prosperity 
entails a country entering into commitments which reduce its political independence” 
since “defending the latter has an economic cost.”4   
This reasoning, as will be seen in the next chapter, reflects the arguments made by 
several historians: Britain’s high levels of defense spending and refusal to fully integrate 
into Western Europe had severely hampered its postwar economy and political power.  
Sharp, on the other hand, argues that Thatcher ensured that Britain maintained its 
sovereignty and independence despite the intense pressure created by the superpowers to 
                                                1	  Paul	  Sharp,	  Thatcher’s	  Diplomacy:	  The	  Revival	  of	  British	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  xiii.	  2	  Turner,	  Britain	  and	  the	  World,	  p.	  227.	  3	  Sharp,	  Thatcher’s	  Diplomacy,	  p.	  xvii.	  4	  Sharp,	  Thatcher’s	  Diplomacy,	  p.	  xvi.	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order and constrain the world within a dependent system, both financially and 
technologically.5  While Sharp does overstate Thatcher’s uniqueness in this aspect of 
postwar British foreign policy (she was not the first postwar Prime Minister to seek 
greater influence and independence than Britain’s economic situation seemed to allow), 
his work corrects an important imbalance in the historical literature caused by the 
fascination and passion aroused by Thatcher’s controversial domestic policies.  This 
thesis seeks to shed further light on Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy and the important 
role she played within the western alliance by examining her response to the US invasion 
of Grenada.   
On 25 October 1983, the United States invaded the island of Grenada in the South 
Caribbean.  President Ronald Reagan decided the Marxist coup that had occurred in 
Grenada on 19 October represented an excellent opportunity to remove a potential Soviet 
satellite from the Western Hemisphere.  A number of international incidents directly 
impacting the United States had already occurred during 1983, including the Soviet 
downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 and the bombing of the US Marine barracks in 
Lebanon, just two days prior to the invasion of Grenada.  While these various incidents 
had important impacts on American foreign policy, the invasion of Grenada also had a 
large impact on Britain’s foreign policy and relationship with the United States.  Grenada 
was a member of the British Commonwealth and a former colony, but the importance of 
the American invasion to British foreign policy had little to do with Grenada itself.  
Instead, the invasion’s timing, occurring just weeks prior to the scheduled deployment of 
                                                5	  Sharp,	  Thatcher’s	  Diplomacy,	  p.	  xvii.	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US operated cruise missiles in the UK and Western Europe, mattered most to Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s government. 
 This thesis argues that the deployment of cruise missiles relied on a strong level 
of trust between the governments of the United States and Britain.  Britain’s decision to 
forgo a dual-key operated launch system for cruise due to its high cost meant that the 
United States would both own and operate the cruise missiles deployed on British soil.  
Many in the British public felt uneasy with this relationship, requiring Thatcher to work 
throughout 1983 to ease public doubt.  The British public questioned whether President 
Reagan, decried as an actor and western cowboy, could be trusted to control nuclear 
weapons on British soil.  The Prime Minister, always eager to tout her close relationship 
with the President, assured them he was trustworthy.  However, her primary argument for 
supporting cruise was its importance to Britain’s foreign and defense policies.  The 
deployment of cruise missiles as a part of NATO’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force 
(INF) represented western unity and determination to match any military buildup by the 
Soviet Union.  Additionally, INF reinforced the United States’ commitment to European 
defense.  Thus, the success or failure of the long-term placement of US cruise missiles in 
the UK required a strong level of trust between the British and US governments.  The 
American invasion of Grenada broke that trust. 
 The invasion of Grenada has previously been overlooked by historians for a 
variety of reasons including unavailable documents, its short duration, and the lack of any 
significant consequences in America’s relations with Britain, or other countries.  While 
Thatcher’s government may have faced greater opposition and protests in its deployment 
of cruise missiles, the missiles were deployed on schedule.  However, recently released 
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documents from the Foreign and Prime Minster’s Office reveal the invasion’s importance 
to the British government.  Additionally, the debates in Parliament following the invasion 
show the danger posed to the Anglo-American alliance by an increasing level of 
disenchantment with the Americans demonstrated by both Conservative and Labour MPs.  
This thesis argues that the British government viewed both the Anglo-American alliance 
and NATO as vulnerable to the external and internal pressures caused by America’s 
invasion of Grenada. 
 While this thesis seeks to go beyond the relationship between President Reagan 
and Prime Minister Thatcher, the Grenada affair provides an opportunity to examine their 
views on foreign policy and the Anglo-American relationship.  Reagan, as the head of a 
superpower and the senior partner in the Anglo-American relationship, could act 
unilaterally and deceptively towards his ally without expecting serious blowback.  
Thatcher, on the other hand, viewed the building and maintenance of strong alliances as 
key to winning the Cold War and maintaining Britain’s place in the world.  Reagan’s 
failure to adequately consult with the British on his decision to invade a small, 
independent country that also happened to be a member of the British Commonwealth 
represented bad alliance diplomacy.  Instead of building trust between the two nations at 
a crucial time in the Cold War, Reagan increased doubts held by the British public and 
even caused Thatcher to question whether a significant shift had occurred in the Anglo-
American relationship and America’s foreign policy.  Her belief in the importance of 
independent nations acting together within the western alliance to withstand Soviet 
encroachments in Western Europe and elsewhere faced an obstacle in Reagan’s 
unilateralism and belligerency. 
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 This thesis begins with a brief exploration of the historiography of Anglo-
American relations in the postwar era.  While historians writing in the years immediately 
following World War II tended to view the relationship as “special” and beneficial to 
Britain, historians now question whether the relationship between the two governments 
ever moved beyond base pragmatism or whether it was more beneficial to Britain than 
the alternative of closer relations with Western Europe.  My second examines the status 
of Anglo-American relations at the time of the invasion of Grenada as well as the history 
of Grenada and the series of events that led to the coup that killed Maurice Bishop.  The 
third chapter explores Reagan’s decision-making process on Grenada.  Additionally, the 
British response to being deceived by their close ally instead of being consulted is 
discussed.  My last chapter details the impact of the American invasion of Grenada on the 
placement of cruise missiles in Britain as well as Western Europe.  The thesis concludes 
with an examination into how the Grenada affair reveals Thatcher’s ideas and 
expectations of the Anglo-American alliance.  The importance of the Grenada affair in 
demonstrating how “middle-ranking” powers such as Britain attempted to maintain 
distinct, independent foreign policies during the super-power age is also explored in the 
conclusion.  
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I.  THE PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIP: A BRIEF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POSTWAR ERA 
 
 The American invasion of Grenada in 1983 revealed much about the attitudes 
held by both President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher regarding 
the Anglo-American alliance.  The lack of consultation on Reagan’s part incensed 
Thatcher, but the British government restrained itself from outright condemnation of US 
action due to the foundational importance of the Anglo-American alliance to Britain’s 
foreign policy.  Margaret Thatcher’s government relied on close cooperation from the 
United States during the 1980s to accomplish its foreign policy objectives.  Her 
government also relied on strong diplomatic relations and support from Western 
European governments.  Thatcher’s strategy of balancing Britain’s relationships with 
Europe and the United States faced many difficulties during her tenure as Prime Minister, 
including America’s unilateral decision to invade Grenada just weeks before the 
scheduled deployment of American cruise missiles in the UK and Western Europe.  The 
Grenada affair thus provides opportunities to study the Anglo-American relationship 
from both a diplomatic and defense perspective. 
Much has been written on relations between the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the postwar period, with the majority of scholars examining the question of 
whether or not a ‘special relationship’ exists between the two nations.  Beyond the simple 
question of whether or not a special relationship exists, a fundamental issue for historians 
has been whether the Anglo-American relationship arose naturally or was created.  The 
term “special relationship” was coined by Winston Churchill in 1945 during a speech in 
the Commons, but made famous by his “Sinews of Peace Address” in Fulton, Missouri, 
in 1946 when he proclaimed that “neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous 
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rise of a world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal 
association of the English-speaking peoples… a special relationship between the British 
Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”6  Many historians believe that 
Churchill did more than just name an already existing phenomena; he played a key role in 
creating the special relationship as well in order to ensure British foreign policy 
objectives were recognized and supported in Washington.7  Other historians deem the 
Anglo-American relationship a product of a shared cultural and political history.  Some 
historians offer variants of these two dominant ideas, but all recognize the importance of 
the relationship between the American President and British Prime Minister in 
establishing the quality and effectiveness of the special relationship.8  The Anglo-
American relationship has proven to be as complex historiographically as it has been 
important politically, and a proper understanding of the alliance is key to interpreting 
British diplomatic and military strategy in the postwar era. 
The period a historian writes in as well as her nationality impact a historian’s 
interpretation of Anglo-American relations.  Every diplomatic dispute between the two 
nations, such as the Suez Crisis or America’s invasion of Grenada, prompts some 
political scientists and social commentators to declare an end to the special relationship; 
but a strong showing of diplomatic unity between the US and UK, such as the Nassau 
Agreement or British support for American wars in the Persian Gulf, causes these same 
                                                
6 Simon Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the era of American 
Hegemony (New York: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 3. 7	  Historian	  John	  Charmley	  states	  that	  the	  special	  relationship	  was	  “in	  very	  large	  measure…	  an	  artifact	  created	  by	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  literary	  and	  political	  artists	  of	  the	  century,	  Winston	  Churchill.”	  	  Churchill’s	  Grand	  Alliance:	  The	  Anglo-­American	  
Special	  Relationship	  1940-­1957	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace,	  1995),	  p.	  3.	  	  
8 Tate, A Special Relationship?, pgs. 4-5. 
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figures to believe the Anglo-American relationship is special again.  Ultimately, the 
historiography of the Anglo-American relationship displays periods of closeness and 
aloofness between the two nations in the postwar period.  Debates on the existence of a 
special quality to the relationship are based on historians’ understanding of current 
circumstances and how they demonstrate a historical continuation of past periods of close 
cooperation or bitter separation.  Additionally, the political and cultural relationship 
between the United States and Britain receives more attention from British politicians, 
historians, and the public at large than from their American counterparts.  The greater 
interest shown by British historians in the existence of a special relationship reflects the 
importance of US-UK relations to the British government and people.  As a result, much 
of the historiography of the Anglo-American relationship focuses on the ability of 
successive British governments to influence American foreign policy in a direction 
favorable to British foreign policy objectives. 
Historians have long debated the question of whether the close postwar 
relationship between the United States and Britain resulted from sentiment or necessity.  
Lionel Gelber’s work America in Britain’s Place (1961) represented an early study of 
Anglo-American relations.  Gelber, a Canadian, described the special relationship 
between Britain and the United States as being focused on mutual interests, especially 
defense.  He believed that “Anglo-American solidarity… [is] the mainstay of the West.”9  
As Britain’s position of leadership in the western world declined following World War II, 
the United States took on the mantle of western leadership.  Gelber asserted that America 
has much to learn from British leadership, and emphasizes the importance of continued 
                                                
9 Lionel Gelber, America in Britain’s Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-
American Unity (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 2. 
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cooperation between the two powers in the face of Soviet aggression.  Gelber’s book was 
released in 1961, the same year Britain entered into negotiations to join the European 
Economic Community.  He sought to influence British decision-makers and public 
opinion by emphasizing Britain’s important relations with America and the 
Commonwealth, which could be diminished through greater European integration. 
 Despite early signs of cooperation between the United States and Britain during 
the first decades of the twentieth century, the special relationship fully developed 
following the United States’ assumption of western leadership during and after World 
War II.  According to Gelber, the peaceful transition of power exemplified the unique 
nature of the Anglo-American relationship.  The unity between the two western nations 
came from their close social and political history, their “common view of man and 
society.”10  Both shared a democratically-based political system that relied on 
compromises between political parties in order to solve problems and come to 
agreements.  Gelber pointed to this dialectical tradition of politics as the primary reason 
the US and Britain were able to transfer leadership of the West and settle their differences 
peacefully.11  Another impetus for compromise, beyond a shared political tradition, was 
both nations’ desire for a world order free of totalitarianism.  Gelber described the Anglo-
American relationship as the one measure keeping the Soviet Union from global 
domination.  With the cost of failure so high, Gelber encouraged the United States to 
learn from Britain’s period of western leadership and to maintain good relations with the 
UK in order to win the East-West conflict.  While Gelber believed the Second World War 
laid the groundwork for the strong military and intelligence sharing between the US and 
                                                
10 Gelber, America in Britain’s Place, p. 10.	  
11 Gelber, America in Britain’s Place, p. 14. 
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UK during the Cold War, he, like all the historians studied in this thesis, pointed to the 
Cold War as the primary impetus and foundation of the Anglo-American relationship. 
 Gelber argued that Britain should forgo closer relations with Europe and keep 
strong Commonwealth ties in order to maintain its place in both the special relationship 
and the global hierarchy, which represented a strong belief in Churchill’s “Three Circles” 
doctrine of British foreign policy.12  He thus contributed to later debates between 
historians on the merits of closer relations with either the United States or Europe, with 
subsequent historians often criticizing British leaders for not recognizing that closer 
relations with Europe would provide better opportunities for British economic and 
diplomatic success.  Historian John Darwin has studied Britain’s strategic plans for each 
of Britain’s three circles of diplomacy, especially the Empire/Commonwealth.  During 
World War II, British leaders were “already aware of the enormous importance of close 
cooperation with the white dominions if they were to make good their claim to be one of 
the ‘Big Three.’”13  However, each of the dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa) rejected calls “for imperial unity and a common foreign policy to which 
Britain, the dominions and the rest of the Empire, including India, would be tied.”14  Each 
nation recognized that in the postwar world centered on the United Nations, “a separate 
voice at the United Nations offered better protection of their ‘national’ interests than 
                                                12	  The	  “three	  circles”	  approach	  to	  Britain’s	  postwar	  foreign	  policy	  views	  Britain	  as	  centrally	  located	  between	  Europe,	  America,	  and	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  Simon	  Tate	  states	  that	  “by	  remaining	  centrally	  involved	  in	  all	  three	  communities,	  and	  acting	  as	  a	  bridge	  uniting	  them,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  Britain	  can	  maintain	  global	  influence	  –	  although	  it	  is	  also	  thought	  essential	  that	  the	  British	  government	  should	  not	  become	  too	  closely	  involved	  with	  any	  one	  of	  the	  three	  communities	  as	  this	  would	  destroy	  its	  position	  as	  a	  mediator	  between	  them.”	  Tate,	  A	  Special	  Relationship?,	  p.	  2.	  13	  John	  Darwin,	  The	  Empire	  Project:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  British	  World	  System	  
1830-­1970	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  519.	  14	  Darwin,	  The	  Empire	  Project,	  p.	  520.	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collective membership of a Commonwealth bloc in which London would enjoy an 
inevitable lead.”15  Additionally, the dominions looked to the United States for security, 
not the United Kingdom.  Thus, while Britain emphasized the importance of the 
Commonwealth and Empire to Britain’s economic and diplomatic strength long after 
World War II ended, prior to the war’s conclusion the government realized that its 
postwar diplomatic strategy would require a close, continual relationship with the United 
States. 
The importance of maintaining the “three circles” diplomatic approach to 
Britain’s foreign policy was evident in Gelber’s work itself.  Gelber believed that 
entering into the European Economic Community would subjugate Britain’s foreign 
policy and relations with Commonwealth countries to European decision makers.  He 
feared this loss of sovereignty would lead to a subsequent loss of Britain’s position as 
“the linchpin of [the] global power structure.”16  While Gelber acknowledged that the 
United States had taken Britain’s place as the primary defender of the Commonwealth 
countries, he believed that Britain still held an important position in directing the 
Commonwealth’s outlook and policy.  Gelber thus demonstrates in his work the struggle 
postwar British governments have endured trying “to maintain a dynamic equilibrium in 
their relationships with governments in the three circles that would allow them to 
maximise their power and influence in world affairs.”17  
 Gelber’s book primarily studies the special relationship’s defensive nature.  
Gelber understood that the Anglo-American relationship arose out of shared political and 
                                                15	  Darwin,	  The	  Empire	  Project,	  p.	  523.	  
16 Gelber, America in Britain’s Place, pgs. 149, 151.	  17	  Tate,	  A	  Special	  Relationship?,	  p.	  2.	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social history, but primarily described it as a relationship of necessity.  Threats arising 
from Germany during the World Wars and the Soviets during the Cold War forced the 
US and Britain to work together.  Gelber thought that the United States had much to learn 
from Britain, going so far as to advise a fundamental change in America’s political 
system to make it more British.  He said that “leadership in a world contest prescribes the 
most effective use of American strength and some other type of representative democracy 
may be better for that.”18  Despite the political advocacy found throughout his book, 
Gelber’s analysis provided a foundation for the future histories of the Anglo-American 
relationship. 
Historian H.G. Nicholas emphasizes the importance of a shared cultural heritage 
in the development of the special relationship in his book The United States and Britain 
(1975).  He believes that “history and geography have combined to endow the foreign 
relations of Britain and the United States with strikingly analogous characteristics.”19  
Due to his understanding of the special relationship arising from a common language and 
past, Nicholas subscribes to the “philosophy of choice” argument rather than the 
“philosophy of necessity” argument, believing that Britain and America developed close 
relations out of shared national interest, not desperation.  American and British policy 
makers have shared an “Anglo-American consciousness” that allows them to see the 
world on the same terms.  This shared worldview and historical understanding naturally 
led the two nations to choose to cooperate in their foreign policy objectives when their 
ideals were threatened during the twentieth century. 
                                                
18 Gelber, America in Britain’s Place, p. 135. 
19 H.G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1975), p. 1.	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Nicholas places joint security concerns as the primary impetus for Anglo-
American relations following World War II.  While personal diplomacy played a part in 
building the Anglo-American alliance, friendships and alliances had been built between 
diplomats and servicemen residing in Washington and London during the war, Nicholas 
still places necessity over choice in describing the special relationship’s motivation.20  
The US needed Britain as a defensive bulwark in Western Europe, and Britain needed US 
financial and military support as it began to adjust to its post-war global position.21  
Nicholas believes the relationship’s basis in necessity can also be seen through the 
nations’ disputes with one another.  When disagreements between the countries arose, 
such as questions on the scope of the Korean War and the Suez Crisis, they often resulted 
from conflicting national interests between Britain and America.22  During the Suez 
Crisis, the British were concerned with protecting an historic lifeline to their Colonial 
possessions East of Suez and maintaining national prestige.  America worried over 
possible Soviet infiltration into the Middle East, and sought to guard the West’s image as 
protectors of peace, not imperialist aggressors.  Ultimately the American position 
prevailed because “Britain needed the U.S.A. more than the U.S.A. needed Britain, both 
in the Middle East and in the wider world.”23 
This view of the special relationship seems to contradict Nicholas’ previous 
assertion that the Anglo-American alliance was built on strong cultural and historical ties.  
He follows the line of reasoning later developed by C.J. Bartlett by emphasizing the 
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importance of common threats and political necessity in the founding and continuance of 
the special relationship.  Nicholas fails to demonstrate from his sources the importance of 
cultural factors in the creation of the Anglo-American alliance during World War II.  
Instead, he seems to indicate that cultural and historical ties merely facilitated the 
development of the special relationship when the need arose. 
In The Special Relationship (1992), C. J. Bartlett provides a short history of the 
Anglo-American relationship from the 1930s until the First Gulf War.  His primary 
proposition is that the special relationship was not natural or instinctive to Anglo-
American leaders, but a political construct created in the face of common threats and 
opponents.  He states that “without the actions of…aggressor states, relations might well 
have been dominated by disputes over economic questions.”24  Bartlett’s position stands 
in opposition to historians like Nicholas and Gelber who believe that common historical 
and cultural ties caused the special relationship to arise naturally in times of need.  
Instead, Bartlett believes the relationship between the US and Britain was neither 
constant nor guaranteed, even during times of international conflict. 
 Bartlett believes that necessity created the special relationship, not sentiment.  
The British and Americans faced common foes during both World War II and the Cold 
War and had no other option than to form a close alliance in order to maintain both 
regional and global security.  Bartlett does recognize that once the relationship was 
established, historical and personal ties were vital to the relationship’s continuance.  
Nevertheless, Bartlett (writing pre-9/11) thought that the future of the special relationship 
was in doubt since its raison d'être had ceased to exist.  He also believed that a reunited 
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Germany presented America with a more attractive alliance than Britain could offer.25  
Bartlett believed that the basis of the special relationship in the future would be a 
common language and culture with no real political influence or cooperation.  This view, 
however, is in contrast to his understanding of the special relationship’s foundation: a 
political union with no strong ties to culture or heritage. 
 In his book A Special Relationship? (2012), Simon Tate studies the Anglo-
American alliance strictly from the perspective of postwar British governments.  He 
argues that beyond any political expediency, “historical and cultural ties between 
countries have been integral to post-war British governments’ perceptions of the special 
relationship.”26  While the US may have viewed the special relationship as being purely 
political in nature, the result of interest not sentiment, the British viewed politics, culture, 
and history as inseparable in their foreign policy.  A key historical construct used by 
British governments has been the idea of the West, and Britain’s place in its hierarchy of 
leadership.  For post-war British governments, the West and the three circles of British 
responsibility (Commonwealth, United States, and Europe) were the same.  Just as the 
three circles approach to foreign policy and the Anglo-American relationship arose after 
World War II, the idea of the West also gained credence after 1945.  The idea of western 
unity was conceived of primarily in response to an Eastern threat, Communism.  While 
politics were important to the West’s creation, common historical and cultural 
backgrounds contributed to a sense of a shared western identity.  British governments 
fused political and cultural ideas in order to create the construct of western unity, and 
thus created a space to “fulfill a political bridge-building role between US and European 
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governments.”27  John Charmley goes beyond Tate’s explanation by describing the 
“special” nature of the Anglo-American alliance is a “benign legend which has been used 
to make the British feel better about the way in which successive Governments have 
subordinated British interests to American desires.”28 
 In describing Britain’s view of the special relationship, Tate utilizes what he 
terms the critical geopolitical method.  This method “draws upon Foucault’s work to 
argue that the way we understand the world is through discourses that are deployed by 
politicians to (re)present the world in different ways.”29  From this perspective British 
politicians did not exaggerate the importance of the West, the special relationship, and 
Britain’s place within them; but instead created a discursive space in which they could 
transform their ideas into reality.  Post-war British governments chose to represent the 
West in a way “which provided the greatest opportunity for British governments to 
continue with an active foreign policy.”30  Thus, the West was presented as completely 
reliant on a strong Anglo-American relationship. 
 Historians investigating the Anglo-American relationship have debated the merits 
of the British government’s decision to place its relationship with the United States at the 
center of its postwar foreign policy.  A key component of this debate has been 
determining how successful successive postwar British governments were in achieving 
their foreign policy objectives.  In Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century (2010), 
Michael J. Turner examines British postwar foreign policy within the framework of the 
“Three Circles” of responsibility described by Winston Churchill: Europe, the 
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Commonwealth, and the United States.  Prior to the decolonization and devaluation of the 
1960s, British governments insisted that they could maintain their global position and 
influence through the “three circles.”  Due to their diminished economic power, however, 
the British came to view “gaining more leverage in Washing DC [as] a permanent goal 
since so many British interests around the world seemed to depend on pushing or 
restraining the Americans.”31  Additionally, Turner states that for Britain, “commitment 
to NATO, strengthening the ‘special relationship’ and maintaining an independent 
deterrent became the core features of defence planning.”32  Clearly, the British viewed a 
strong Anglo-American relationship as the foundation of their post-1960 foreign policy.    
Many historians, such as Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 
(1987) and John Dumbrell in A Special Relationship (2006), argue that Britain steadily 
lost much its economic and political power due to a failure to adjust to its changed 
circumstances following World War II.33  If the British government had recognized its 
inability to maintain its global commitments following the war, it could have focused its 
financial expenditures on improving Britain’s economy at home instead of attempting to 
maintain its position abroad.  Turner, however, argues that Britain’s decline has been 
exaggerated.  Turner believes that historians like Kennedy, who believe Britain would not 
have struggled as much economically if it had devoted more attention to just one of the 
circles (Europe) instead of trying to maintain influence in each circle are producing an 
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analysis that is “unwarrantably negative and condemnatory.”34  He instead insists that 
“what is most noteworthy is not Britain’s relative decline, but Britain’s ability to manage 
and minimize decline.”35  The Anglo-American relationship and the influence it enabled 
represented a key part of this decline management.  Just as in the debate on the “special” 
aspect of the Anglo-American relationship, historians often come to their conclusions on 
the relative success or failure of the Anglo-American alliance based on the period they 
write in or on. 
Ritchie Ovendale’s book Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century 
(1998) emphasizes the important role British politicians played in the development of the 
special relationship.  Ovendale believes the academic study of the special relationship 
began in earnest after the British Public Records Act of 1958 was adjusted under Harold 
Wilson, which reduced the “fifty-year rule” for release of government documents to 
thirty years.  This change shifted the study of Anglo-American relations to Britain, where 
the alliance was viewed from the perspective of British policy makers and presented 
Britain as a much more active member in the special relationship than previously 
believed.36  This could be explained by the historians’ reliance on primarily British 
sources, which Ovendale depends on as well. 
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 Ovendale questions the historical narrative that the West was led into the Cold 
War by America following World War II by demonstrating the importance of British 
officials in shaping American opinion towards the Soviets.  Ovendale, along with 
Bartlett, Tate, and Turner, supports the idea that the Cold War brought an Anglo-
American special relationship into being.  While close cooperation, especially in defense 
matters, existed during World War II, rifts between the two nations began to rise towards 
the end of the war that were exacerbated in the war’s immediate aftermath.  Charmley 
describes Churchill’s efforts in the early 1950s “to revive his vision of the old wartime 
alliance” as “sad and revealed how little substance there had been to it.”37  The abrupt 
cessation of Lend-Lease threw Britain’s economy into turmoil, and a clear danger existed 
of American withdrawal from world affairs, as had happened following World War I.  
Britain could not afford to maintain its presence in Greece and Turkey, key Soviet 
targets, as well as the rest of the world.  Thus, as John Darwin records, “Britain was 
being dragged willy-nilly into confrontation with a power of awesome military strength 
and possibly limitless ambitions.  At the same time, it was also deeply uncertain… what 
part the United States might play in resisting Soviet aggression.”38   
After educating the Americans on the dangers posed by the Soviet Union in 
Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, the British government maneuvered America, 
the Commonwealth, and Western Europe into a defensive alliance.  Ovendale in 
particular credits Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin for establishing the groundwork 
that led to NATO and the Anglo-American relationship.  Through the post-war special 
relationship, “Britain could achieve a position closely related to that of the United States, 
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and yet sufficiently independent of it to be able to influence American policy in the 
desired direction.”39  However, Ovendale insists that the special relationship did not 
always exist.  At times, particularly during Eisenhower’s early presidential years, 
America viewed Britain as “just being one among a number of allies.”40  After the Suez 
Crisis, rapprochement between the allies was spurred by the continued threat of Soviet 
incursions in the Middle East and elsewhere.  
 Ovendale believes that throughout the postwar era, “there was a pragmatic 
calculation as to how Britain could best utilize the special relationship in its own 
interests.”41  He acknowledges that the Anglo-American relationship was more important 
to the British than to the Americans, but believes the British presented themselves as 
necessary allies, and took it upon themselves to educate the Americans as they attempted 
to create a Pax Americana reminiscent of the Pax Britannica.  However, despite the 
transfer of leadership from London to Washington, British politicians continued to work 
the special relationship to achieve their desired foreign policy goals.  Pragmatism brought 
the Americans and British together in the postwar era, and Ovendale observes that “there 
is little evidence of sentimentality in the attitude of British policymakers in their 
understanding and operation of the special relationship with the United States.”42  
Charmley disagrees with Ovendale’s assessment of the Anglo-American relationship.  He 
argues that “Churchill’s ‘misguided sentimental investment’” in Anglo-American unity 
“paid few dividends for Britain.”43  Instead of operating in Britain’s best interests, the 
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“British political establishment was so locked into its vision of the ‘special relationship’ 
that psychological dependence dictated submission.”44 
 Simon Tate, similarly to Ovendale, recognizes that the special relationship has 
received much more attention in British politics and popular culture than in America, and 
that “for successive British governments maintaining the vitality of the special 
relationship has been a key foreign policy aim.”45  It is thus evident that from the British 
perspective, the Anglo-American special relationship has been a reality and a necessity 
since World War II.  In a similar fashion to Turner, Tate’s work attempts “to provide 
counterbalance to the prevailing view in academia that post-war British governments 
have accepted their declining status and influence in the special relationship since 1945, 
and that the rate of decline accelerated markedly following the events of the Suez Crisis 
in the late 1950s.”46  Tate describes Churchill’s view of the Anglo- American alliance as 
a grudging acceptance of junior partnership, but still expecting an active role in 
determining and taking action on foreign policy.  Tate asserts that this original perception 
of a hegemonic special relationship has not changed despite the waning of British power 
and prestige internationally.47   
In order to explain the British view of American hegemony, Tate draws upon the 
analysis of the interplay of coercion and consent developed by Italian political thinker 
Antonio Gramsci.  America had a strong means of coercion through its nuclear arsenal, 
but threats of nuclear war could not be used against European or other allies.  Since 
hegemony in Gramsci’s formulation can only operate through the consent of its members, 
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conflicts that cannot be solved coercively must be solved relationally.  Tate concludes 
that while British governments recognized America’s coercive strength both 
economically and militarily, they had “considered that within Europe and the 
Commonwealth [Britain] retained the greater relational power and therefore the greater 
ability to lead those governments by consent.”48  Thus, the British viewed themselves as 
indispensible partners in the hegemonic order of the United States, expecting due 
recompense for assisting the US in solving international disputes that could not be 
handled coercively. 
While historians have generally agreed that the Anglo-American relationship was 
built on necessity and used primarily by the British to achieve their foreign policy goals, 
questions remain on whether the relationship was beneficial to the British, and to what 
degree the British succeeded in swaying American foreign policy decisions. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the British government began to reexamine its position within the 
“three circles,” specifically with Europe.  In A Special Relationship, John Dumbrell 
focuses on the Anglo-American relationship after 1960.  Dumbrell, like Ovendale and 
Tate, examines the relationship from the British government’s perspective.  He seeks to 
determine “the degree to which the ‘special relationship,’ in its Cold War and post-Cold 
War incarnations, has signified partnership and mutuality, rather than simple US 
dominance.”49  Additionally, Dumbrell attempts to distinguish between “the ‘special 
relationship’ as policy and the ‘special relationship’ as a state of international 
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interaction.”50  While the United States’ foreign policy relied on good relations with 
Britain and Europe, the British have relied on one aspect of the “special relationship” or 
another to accomplish their postwar foreign policy, whether it be nuclear, financial, or 
diplomatic cooperation.51  The British, like all middle-ranking powers during the Cold 
War, “used various strategies to enhance their security without undue sacrifice of 
sovereignty.”52  Britain’s strategy relied on the mutual interests and culture found in the 
Anglo-American alliance to accomplish its goals while maintaining its sovereignty.    
Difficulties arose as the United States pushed Britain to engage with Europe to a 
greater degree both politically and economically in the 1960s.  As Britain’s global 
presence increasingly declined throughout the 1960s, its usefulness to the United States 
came to depend more on its ability to influence European affairs in a direction favorable 
to the United States.  Prior to Macmillan’s government, however, the British believed 
they could better influence US policy as the head of the Commonwealth and as a 
distinctly Atlantic, not European, power.  This thinking, as Dumbrell believes, caused the 
British government to maintain a distorted view of the world, resisting the inevitability of 
Britain’s future with Europe.  Thus, the idea of a special relationship “unquestionably 
bolstered British pomposity and unrealism during the Cold War, making the management 
of decline even more problematic.”53 
Historians agree that Britain’s global position, both economically and militarily, 
declined during the 1960s, prompting the British government to reevaluate its traditional 
foreign policy of close relations with the United States and the Commonwealth nations 
                                                50	  Dumbrell,	  A	  Special	  Relationship,	  p.	  12.	  51	  Dumbrell,	  A	  Special	  Relationship,	  p.	  12.	  52	  Dumbrell,	  A	  Special	  Relationship,	  p.	  16.	  53	  Dumbrell,	  A	  Special	  Relationship,	  p.	  17.	  
 25 
and limited economic and political integration with Europe.  Turner emphasizes that 
before the 1960s, Britain succeeded in proving its military and diplomatic worth to the 
United States.  He cites a US strategic report from 1951 detailing that “Britain alone 
among Americas allies had the resources of an independent military power” that could 
act on the global stage.54  As a result, the United States treated Britain preferentially in its 
nuclear policy as well as the access it granted to the British government.  Turner brings 
specific attention to Britain’s ability to resist US pressure that pushed for greater 
European integration.  Despite a strong belief that British integration with Europe would 
provide greater American influence in Europe, American leaders in the 1950s “did not 
press Britain too hard, since Britain’s wider role in collective recovery and rearmament 
was too important to be sacrificed for the sake of integration.”55  David Watt in his essay 
The Anglo-American Relationship explains that Britain in the 1960s no longer had “the 
political, economic, or military power to ensure either (a) a purely British veto over any 
single American policy (except where, as in the case of bases in Britain, British 
sovereignty is directly involved) or (b) a purely British ability to influence the general 
direction of American foreign policy.”56  Thus, according to Watt, the special relationship 
had effectively concluded by the end of the 1960s and the British government needed to 
reexamine its foreign policy.   
However, Britain’s refusal to join in the early efforts to construct an economically 
interconnected Europe, as well as its close relations with the United States (particularly 
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its nuclear cooperation) created immense difficulties for the British government in its 
attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s, as French 
President Charles De Gaulle viewed British entry into the EEC as a potential avenue of 
American interference in European affairs.  Britain’s devaluation crisis of 1967 as well as 
Harold Wilson’s decision to cut drastically Britain’s defense budget and presence “East 
of Suez” in the same year “provoked a sense of outrage in Washington, and stoked the 
resentment felt at Britain’s failure to supply troops to Vietnam.”57  Excluded from the 
EEC and widely viewed as insignificant by the United States, subsequent British 
governments argued over a “Europe-versus-the United States” direction for Britain’s 
foreign policy throughout the 1970s, and attempted to endear themselves to either side 
depending on which Prime Minister occupied 10 Downing Street.58 
Party affiliation, at least until the 1980s, was relatively insignificant (compared 
with what we might assume based on twenty-first century politics) in determining one’s 
support of an Anglo-American or Anglo-European foreign policy.  Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government in the early 1970s attempted to move Britain towards Europe, 
while the subsequent Labour governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan “were 
concerned to repair the fences which they saw Heath as having damaged” with the United 
States.59  Watt believes that Heath understood “the emotional importance to the 
Europeans of a British ‘commitment’ to the Community,” displayed this commitment in 
his willingness to offend Americans in order to endear Britain to European nations.60  
Heath “snubbed Kissinger’s Year of Europe in 1973 and later in the same year joined 
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other European countries in refusing to allow American planes to use British bases to 
reinforce the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli war.”61  Watt recognizes that the issue of the 
Arab-Israeli war represented a real conflict of interests between Britain and the United 
States going back to the very creation of the Israeli state in 1948, but on most foreign 
policy issues Heath “merely alienated the Americans without greatly improving Britain’s 
relations with the Community.”62 
Dumbrell also believes that Heath “lacked the instinctive pro-Americanism of 
other British prime ministers.”63  The Prime Minister believed strongly in Britain’s future 
as a European nation, and successfully brought Britain into the EEC in 1973 (although 
this had more to do with De Gaulle’s absence from the Élysée Palace than Heath’s 
presence at 10 Downing Street).  Heath questioned the extent of US power and instituted 
a policy of “conscious distancing of London from Washington which he saw as necessary 
to ease Britain into the European Community.”64  Heath, unlike prior and later Prime 
Ministers, believed Britain would benefit more from proximity to Europe than to the 
United States.  He believed the structure of the Anglo-American relationship benefitted 
American interests far more than British interests.  A relationship between equals in 
Europe would benefit Britain much more than Britain’s vastly unequal relationship with 
the United States.  However, Dumbrell also notes that the difficulties between Britain and 
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America during Heath’s premiership can be exaggerated.65  Heath recognized that an 
expanded relationship with Europe helped the British government maintain its global 
position and its importance to the United States. 
As Foreign Secretary under Harold Wilson from 1974 to 1976, and as Prime 
Minister from 1976 to 1980, James Callaghan worked on restoring amicable relations 
between the US and Britain.  Dumbrell explains that he returned to the traditional role 
adopted by the British Prime Minister as an “Atlantic intermediary: explainer of 
America’s ways to Europe and of Europe’s ways to America.”66  This role proved that 
British governments still struggled with fully placing their interests within Europe and 
acting less as a full participant within Europe and more as an outside force.  While 
Britain’s influence had steadily declined, Callaghan still believed he could act “as a 
defuser of potential US-European misunderstandings on the intertwined issues of 
disarmament and détente.”67  However, Dumbrell believes Callaghan’s strategy was 
flawed.  By positioning Britain as an Atlantic power instead of a European power, 
Callaghan risked making Britain insignificant.  The Americans sought greater European 
influence, and thus could turn greater attention to France or West Germany instead of 
Britain.  Additionally, Callaghan’s decision to distance Britain from Europe could hurt 
Britain’s credibility as a reliable and strong EEC member.68   
Thus, at the outset of Thatcher’s premiership, the British government still had the 
same basic question at the foundation of its foreign policy as it had for the past twenty 
years: should Britain be a European or Atlantic power?  However, greater 
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historiographical attention has been paid to Thatcher’s relationship with President Reagan 
than on how she sought to answer this question.  As a result, the relationship between 
President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher has dominated the study of Britain’s 
foreign policy in the 1980s.  Both leaders represented a turn toward conservative 
government and a “widely heralded departure from the norm of mainstream non-
ideological governments and centrist politics.”69  On foreign policy, Reagan returned to 
an attitude of confrontation towards the USSR, both in his discourse and his actions 
abroad.  Thatcher also clearly stood opposed to the Soviet Union, but historians differ on 
Thatcher’s ability to maintain an independent foreign policy and to favorably influence 
the direction of America’s foreign policy for Britain’s benefit.  Recent historians have 
studied the relationship between Reagan and Thatcher as a microcosm of the wider 
“special relationship” between the two countries. 
In his work Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage (2007), 
Nicholas Wapshott describes a close, friendly relationship between Thatcher and Reagan.  
He believes that Thatcher “achieved, through her guidance based upon the vision she 
shared with the President, an altering of course that no British Prime Minister has 
managed since Winston Churchill.”70  Due to her close relationship with the President, a 
shared worldview, and a strong personality, Thatcher became the leader within the 
Anglo-American relationship.  Wapshott states that in the 1980s, “it was [Thatcher] who 
made the demands… and it was Reagan who willingly made the concessions.”71  In 
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Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (2012), Richard Aldous argues in 
contrast that the two leaders shared common goals, but differing methods of achieving 
those goals.  Thatcher relied on strong alliance-building and good relations between the 
US and Europe to achieve her foreign policy objectives while Reagan often acted 
unilaterally, as in the case of Grenada.  Both, however, wanted their relationship to be 
perceived as close and “special.”  Aldous says “it was a view they had consciously 
attempted to foster during their shared time in office,” and that “each had vigorously 
asserted it in their memoirs and reminiscences.”72  Aldous, however, believes that behind 
the facade of a close relationship lay “a complex, even fractious alliance.”73  The Grenada 
affair thus represents a hiccup in an otherwise amicable relationship to Wapshott, while 
Aldous views the event as representative of a much more significant fracture between 
Reagan and Thatcher. 
Historians have studied the American invasion of Grenada primarily in the 
context of American Cold War belligerency and regional politics.74  The central debate 
on the invasion focuses on the question of whether Reagan’s actions were legal or 
warranted.  Historians tend to doubt the legality of Reagan’s invasion of Grenada as well 
as the dangers posed to American students on the island by the new government.  
Historians also believe Reagan’s unilateral decision to invade Grenada when the 
opportunity arose demonstrates a larger pattern within his foreign policy.  In his essay 
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America, Europe, and the Imperial Legacy (1986), Edward Mortimer describes Reagan’s 
tendency “to see all world politics as a competition between [America] and the Soviet 
Union.”75  He argues that Reagan’s actions in Nicaragua and Grenada exemplify a classic 
tenet of imperialism, the horror vacui, a “fear that any space on the global chessboard left 
unoccupied will be seized by a rival and then used to threaten one’s existing positions.”76  
Grenada thus represented a potential threat, possibly another Cuba, in the region Reagan 
often referred to as America’s “backyard.”  Grenada thus presents historians with an 
opportunity to study the differing strategies employed by both Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan in their efforts to restrain and rollback Soviet power.   
As has been seen, the American invasion of Grenada has previously been 
examined solely within the context of American hemispheric relations or the relationship 
between President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher.  In The President, the Pope, and 
the Prime Minister (2006), John O’Sullivan provides a limited overview of how the 
American invasion of Grenada impacted the deployment of cruise missiles in Britain, but 
presents it as largely insignificant since the deployment occurred.77  He is thus 
representative of many historians who believe the American invasion of Grenada 
warrants little study since its impacts were limited.  I argue instead that the impact of the 
American invasion of Grenada on British foreign and domestic policy warrants greater 
study.  As newly released documents from the Foreign Office and the Office of the Prime 
Minister reveal, the Grenada affair caused great concern in Whitehall.  The timing of the 
                                                75	  Edward	  Mortimer,	  America,	  Europe,	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Legacy,	  in The ‘Special 
Relationship:’ Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 eds. William Roger Louis and 
Hedley Bull (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 357.	  76	  Edward	  Mortimer,	  America,	  Europe,	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Legacy,	  p.	  357.	  77	  John	  O’Sullivan,	  The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister: Three Who 
Changed the World (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2006),	  p.	  226.	  
 32 
invasion created difficulties for the scheduled deployment of cruise missiles the month 
following the invasion.  Additionally, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were 
concerned over a potential shift in American foreign policy that could undermine 
Britain’s established defensive and diplomatic strategies.  While the missiles were 
deployed successfully, the invasion intensified anti-American sentiment and placed the 
western alliance in danger as left-leaning political groups increasingly saw the United 
States as a belligerent power on par with the Soviets.  Richard Ullman’s essay America, 
Britain, and the Soviet Threat in Historical and Present Perspective (1986), demonstrates 
the uncertainty of American-European relations during the 1980s.  To Ullman, “the 
European refrain is that American policies have heightened East-West tensions and have 
shattered détente.”78   
Reagan’s nuclear policies, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and his 
interventionist foreign policy had reinvigorated left-leaning political parties across 
Europe, especially in Britain and West Germany.  Ullman describes these parties as 
“substantially more radical and left-leaning” in 1986 “than they were in 1979 and 1982, 
respectively, when they last governed their countries.”79  While the Labour Party in 
Britain had previously upheld the importance of Britain’s nuclear deterrent and the 
relationship with the United States, it had experienced “a drastic shake-up of leadership 
and [reflected] the currently much more radical and anti-American orientation of [its] 
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activist rank-and-file members.”80  Ullman points directly to American actions in the 
Third World as the reason for the shift in the British politics and public opinion.  He 
states that: 
American policies in the Third World… make it easy for Europeans to argue that 
in their external behavior there is no meaningful difference between the United 
States and the Soviet Union and that the mere condition of being a superpower 
will inevitably cause them to act in a similar manner: both seek hegemony.  
Neither will tolerate political diversity within its sphere of influence.  Therefore 
both are undeserving of aid or comfort or political support.81 
 
A real danger clearly existed that the relationship between the United States 
and Britain could be undone in part due to Reagan’s unilateral decision to invade 
Grenada in 1983 without consulting the British government or recognizing the 
untimely nature of his action as relating to cruise deployment.  With public opinion 
already uncertain regarding the placement of American nuclear weapons on British 
soil, even the hint that the American President might have a tendency for rash action 
created immense problems for Thatcher’s planned placement of cruise missiles.  
Additionally, with the Labour Party calling for denuclearization, the Anglo-American 
alliance itself faced the possibility of extinction.  Without close nuclear cooperation, 
there would “not be much left of the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship.’”82 
While the relationship between the United States and Britain may not have been 
any more “special” than any other geopolitical relationship held by the two nations, it 
represented a key component of Britain’s entire postwar foreign policy.  Margaret 
Thatcher’s ability to maintain the relationship and soothe over public uncertainty 
following the Grenada crisis ensured that Britain’s relationship with the United States 
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endured, and that Britain’s work to build a strong European alliance opposed to Soviet 
expansion was not in vain.  Whether one believes that the Anglo-American alliance 
represented a beneficial relationship for Britain in the postwar era or not, the Grenada 
affair marked a much more important moment in the history of Britain’s postwar foreign 
policy than has previously been believed.  The next chapter will examine the current state 
of Anglo-American relations at the time of the Grenada affair as well as the series of 
events that occurred in Grenada in the run-up to the American invasion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
II.  FROM “DISTANT ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC” TO AN ISLAND 
IN AMERICA’S “BACKYARD:” THE RUN-UP TO INVASION  
 
The defense policy of the United States is based on a simple premise: The United States 
does not start fights. We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to 
deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace. 
- Ronald Reagan83 
 
 The crisis in Grenada occurred at a low point in Anglo-American relations. The 
first major Anglo-American diplomatic conflict in the years before the Grenada crisis 
involved economic sanctions against the USSR.  The Polish government had declared 
martial law on 13 December 1981 in response to growing Solidarity agitation for political 
reforms, and had established a Military Council for National Salvation.  As the situation 
within Poland continued to deteriorate, the United States and Britain viewed the Soviets 
as the instigators behind the political crackdown.  The possibility of Soviet intervention 
in the affairs of a distressed state, which had recently occurred in Afghanistan, loomed 
large.  However, the proposed solutions to the problems revealed an important disparity 
in how Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher approached international diplomacy. 
Thatcher primarily sought a solution to the problem in Poland without involving 
the Soviet Union at all.  She believed that offering Poland the carrot of food relief, 
rescheduled debts, and a renewed aid program would produce the desired result without 
recourse to the stick of economic sanctions.84  The desired result was Poland’s ability to 
solve its problems internally, without outside interference from the USSR or NATO.  In a 
letter to President Reagan on 22 December, Thatcher emphasized that “the Western 
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response should be both firm and coordinated.”85  In particular, the UK feared a US-led 
effort to bring the matter up for debate in the UN Security Council.  Never before had a 
resolution on the human rights within an individual country been debated within the 
Security Council, and the British Government feared a precedent would be set allowing 
“the other side” to use the same medium to pass judgment on the human rights situation 
in Northern Ireland and other places under British sovereignty.86  As the level of Soviet 
involvement became clearer, the United States prepared a list of economic sanctions 
against the USSR, without reference to the UK.  While calls from the US for the 
cancellation of Aeroflot landing rights and a cessation on negotiations for a new grain 
agreement sparked little debate, the demand to halt the transfer of materiel for the 
construction of the Soviets’ Siberian pipeline caused great concern.87 
When the US government first announced the sanctions in December 1981, the 
ban on pipeline materiel affected only US companies, but the President hoped that his 
NATO allies would also accept the sanctions and present a united front against the 
Soviets.  The British Government doubted the willingness of European countries to 
accept US sanctions against the USSR, and thus felt disinclined to push for sanctions in 
Europe.  Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, believed that the sanctions 
proposed by the United States focused “more on East-West relations than on the situation 
in Poland,” a theme which arose again and again in Anglo-American foreign policy 
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debates.88  As her previous letter on 22 December had seemingly been dismissed, the 
Prime Minister again wrote to President Reagan expressing concern “that the unity of the 
Western alliance could be seriously damaged by the current differences over how to react 
to the repression in Poland.”  The proposed sanctions were in danger of providing the 
Soviets with a propaganda victory, and doing “more harm to the West than to the Soviet 
Union.”89  Thatcher’s irritation “was increased still further by the news that the 
Americans were intending to renew grain sales to the USSR on the pretext that this would 
drain the USSR of hard currency – but transparently because it was in the interests of 
American farmers to sell their grain.”90  Reagan’s hypocrisy, as well as the economic toll 
cancelling the contracts would entail, caused Thatcher and her European allies to demand 
that the existing European contracts be allowed to go forward.   
The events surrounding the Falklands War soon took precedence over the 
situation in Poland, but the question of sanctions resurfaced on 18 June 1982 when the 
United States announced the extension of the pipeline ban from only US companies to 
their foreign subsidiaries as well, such as the Scottish firm John Brown Engineering.  The 
Prime Minister “harshly criticized” the US decision during a press conference with the 
Italian Prime Minister on 8 July, a rare example of Thatcher publically criticizing the 
United States.91  In addition to the decision itself, which represented a rejection of 
conclusions presented by British and European Governments regarding the importance of 
the pipeline to their economic and energy needs, the timing of the US announcement also 
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irritated Thatcher.  Coming just four days after the Argentinean surrender in the South 
Atlantic, the US pronouncement seemed to disregard the wishes of its ascendant ally, and 
dismiss the notion that Britain was once again a world player.   
Reagan’s decision to expand the sanctions just days after his “chief ally’s” victory 
must be understood within the larger context of Anglo-American disagreement over both 
the Falklands War and differences in East-West strategy.  Reagan believed that Britain’s 
insistence on recapturing the Falklands opened an opportunity for a Soviet-friendly 
government to come to power in a defeated Argentina, thus depriving the United States 
of a strong anti-Communist government in South America.  Britain’s willingness to 
“trade with the enemy” and ensure European dependency on Soviet energy sources also 
irked President Reagan.  The pipeline dispute continued until a compromise was reached 
allowing for a single pipeline instead of the planned double pipeline.  Thatcher criticized 
Reagan’s pipeline diplomacy in her memoirs, writing that “what I found irritating and on 
occasion quite unjustified was the way in which the actions the Americans preferred 
inflicted a good deal more pain on their allies than on themselves and, one might argue, 
the communists in Poland and the Soviet Union.”92  Despite a satisfying resolution, 
Thatcher remembered Reagan’s actions as “a lesson in how not to conduct alliance 
business.”93 
The other serious disagreement in the months leading up to the Grenada crisis was 
the Falklands War.  In April 1982, Britain faced the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland 
Islands with little American support for the first few weeks of the war.  Instead of rushing 
to support his closest ally, Reagan relied heavily on the advice of many of his top 
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advisors who thought the US should remain neutral so as not to offend America’s South 
American allies.  Margaret Thatcher’s political life was in jeopardy, as a failure to take 
back the Falklands or paying too high a price in lives and treasure to do so would surely 
bring down her government. Despite the danger to Thatcher’s government and British 
prestige, Reagan revealed a startlingly low level of concern for his chief ally’s political 
future in the early weeks of the conflict.  One reason for the weak American response 
was disagreement within the administration on how to respond.  In a telegram to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), British Ambassador to the United States 
Nicholas Henderson stated that “there were those who attached great importance to the 
preservation of US relations with Latin America; the need to give the Russians and 
Cubans no opportunities in this Hemisphere; the general anti-war sentiment in the 
aftermath of Vietnam; and the widely held view, however unreasonable, that the 
Falklands are a ‘Colonial’ problem.”94  Reagan’s advisors who held these positions 
pushed for a mediatory role in the conflict. 
Richard Aldous believes that some American diplomats, such as General Vernon 
Walters, inadvertently encouraged the Argentineans to strike by dismissing the possibility 
of any British reprisals, and by promising to assuage Britain’s “wounded pride.”95  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, the United States’ Ambassador to the United Nations, firmly believed that 
the US should support its hemispheric allies, even if they were authoritarian regimes.96    
Although Argentina had endangered America’s Atlantic ally, it fully supported the 
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United States in the wider East-West conflict and thus must be kept close.  On the other 
hand, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, an “unabashed Anglophile,” offered the 
British immediate aid in military materiel and intelligence.97  The disagreement over how 
to respond originated in the confusion over which diplomatic paradigm should be favored 
– the East-West or the Atlantic.  At first, Reagan hesitated to send immediate aid, both 
militarily and diplomatically, to Britain to ensure that Thatcher’s Government survived 
the crisis.  He later changed course, but the vacillation caused deep fissures in his own 
administration as well as the Anglo-American relationship. 
Thatcher recognized Reagan’s difficult position, not wanting “to choose between 
Britain, their natural ally, and their interests in Latin America.”98  However, Thatcher felt 
that the President should have agreed with Casper Weinberger, who believed that 
“America could not put a NATO ally and long-standing friend on the same level as 
Argentina.”99  Weinberger explained his sympathetic position towards the British by 
stating that “we could not condone, by silence or inaction, naked aggression anywhere, 
certainly not in our own hemisphere and not by a corrupt military dictatorship against one 
of our NATO allies.”100  Throughout the early days of the conflict, US Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig continued to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict involving a 
ceasefire and further negotiations to determine the question of which nation could claim 
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sovereignty over the Falklands.  Haig traveled from Washington to Buenos Aires to 
London constantly in his herculean efforts to avert further armed conflict.  These efforts 
often annoyed Thatcher, who believed that the US should stop hesitating and come down 
on the side of its closest ally.  In a phone call with Haig on 14 April, Thatcher sternly 
rejected the wording of a statement to be put out by the Secretary of State claiming that 
“Britain’s use of the US facilities on Ascension Island had been restricted” due to the 
mediating role adopted by the US government.101  In addition to reminding Haig that 
Ascension Island belonged to the United Kingdom and the British navy had full access to 
its facilities, Thatcher also relayed the House of Commons’ disapproval of the United 
States positioning itself squarely between a dictator and a democracy.102 
President Reagan, meanwhile, continued to push for a non-military solution to the 
problem.  This desire was not the result of a sudden aversion to bloodshed, but a product 
of Reagan’s profound fear of Communism’s spread into the Western Hemisphere.  In his 
diary on 14 April, responding to the same press story as Haig had when he formulated his 
statement regarding Ascension Island, Reagan stated: “In what I think is a most 
irresponsible act… they [the press] have charged that we are lending aid to Britain’s 
Navy in the Falklands dispute.”103  His anger at being accused of helping his closest ally 
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clearly demonstrates that personal politics were subservient to regional and global 
politics during the Falkland’s War.   
On 30 April, Thatcher received her desired cooperation as “the United States now 
came down clearly on our side.”104  President Reagan condemned the Argentinean 
aggression and promised to assist the UK with military materiel.  Weinberger 
immediately “directed the Defense Department to expedite all existing requests from the 
United Kingdom for military support,” and ensured “that all new British requests were to 
have first priority.”105  The support had come, but the time and energy required to gain 
this assistance from such a supposedly close ally left Thatcher troubled.  Ambassador 
Henderson summarized the efforts to gain US support by stating that “it is I think 
important to bear in mind that US assistance should not be taken for granted; that it 
required constant working on the US administration, congress and public opinion to keep 
them in the right position; and that its value to us is very great.”106 
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As will be seen again in the Grenada crisis, the Soviet Union was a greater enemy 
in Reagan’s estimation than Britain was an ally.  Reagan was willing to upset his British 
allies in order to keep a friendly, anti-Communist government in charge of an important 
regional country.  He made this choice clear to Margaret Thatcher in a heated 
conversation on 31 May when he stated his fear “about what happens if the present 
government, as bad as it’s been in this whole affair, if it falls and is replaced as it would 
be by the leftist Peronists.”107  Margaret Thatcher, surely struggling to find any sympathy 
for the government in Argentina, refused to end military operations without Argentinean 
surrender and withdrawal.  Reagan had pledged his public support, but his conversation 
with Thatcher revealed that he continued to privately push the Prime Minister to 
compromise with the Argentineans long after his public declaration of support. 
Toward the end of the conflict in the South Atlantic, President Reagan visited the 
United Kingdom and addressed an assembly of Members of Parliament in the Royal 
Gallery at Westminster.  Al Haig described the general European opinion of Reagan at 
the time as a western cowboy, ready to turn the Cold War hot.108  In his speech he sought 
to achieve “the twin goals of persuading the people of Europe that he was committed to 
peace and that his defense buildup was a necessary pre-condition for being able to 
negotiate with the Russians.”109  Reagan believed that in order to accomplish the goal of 
“reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides,” there must 
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first be equality in nuclear deployment.110  The West could only negotiate from a position 
of strength.  While his defense of INF deployment provided support for Reagan and 
Thatcher’s shared goals, he gave small attention to Thatcher’s hugely important endeavor 
over the Falklands.  Well into his speech he stated that: 
On distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, 
yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifice for lumps of rock and earth 
so far away. But those young men aren’t fighting for mere real estate. They fight 
for a cause— for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed, 
and the people must participate in the decisions of government… the decisions of 
government under the rule of law.111 
 
Reagan clearly could have provided a more vehement defense of Britain’s war effort, 
but he placed the British effort within the larger context of East-West relations and 
the clash of ideologies. 
 Following Reagan’s Westminster address, Prime Minister Thatcher hosted the 
President at 10 Downing Street for lunch and gave a speech in his honor, thanking the 
President and Secretary of State Haig for their strong support of Britain’s war effort 
despite the “considerable cost to American interests.”  Thatcher also thanked the 
President for his efforts to build European unity on defense issues, acknowledging that 
“you recognized how central your allies were to America’s interests and vice versa – that 
no country, however strong, can remain an island in the modern world.”  She concluded 
her speech with an emphasis on the Anglo-American alliance and hailed “our ability to 
discuss problems of common interests… to discuss them freely and candidly, not 
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necessarily always agreeing, but giving and taking advice as family friends, without 
exciting anxiety or envy.”112   
However, just days before Reagan’s visit to London, a particularly embarrassing 
episode in Anglo-American relations occurred at the United Nations.  As the Times 
reported on 5 June 1982, “The United States joined Britain last night in blocking a draft 
resolution in the Security Council for a ceasefire in the Falklands conflict but later 
admitted that its veto should have been an abstention.”113  As the UK delegation to the 
UN described in a telegraph to the FCO, “after the vote, Mrs. Kirkpatrick astonishingly 
stated that she had been asked by her government to say that if it were possible to change 
a vote once cast, the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an 
abstention.”114  While the US had voted with the UK, Kirkpatrick’s statement following 
the vote nullified the argument that Britain was not alone on the Security Council in 
rejecting a cease-fire.  Britain had been abandoned by the United States and “there was 
no doubt that Argentina would use the episode to its full advantage in its propaganda war 
against the British Government.”115  Clearly President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Thatcher shared common goals and ideologies, but as the difficulties that arose during the 
Falklands crisis and the Grenada affair reveal, both American action and inaction caused 
a great deal of anxiety for Margaret Thatcher.  Thatcher’s speech honoring President 
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Reagan reflected her hopes for what the Anglo-American relationship could be, rather 
than how it actually functioned in reality. 
Following the British victory in the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher’s 
popularity in Britain soared.  Thatcher felt she had restored Britain’s place in the world as 
well as its self-confidence as a nation.  She proudly stated that “everywhere I went after 
the war, Britain’s name meant something more than it had.”116  Thatcher had ensured the 
assistance of the United States despite the rifts within the Reagan administration on how 
to respond to the Falklands crisis.  The Conservative Party won a landslide electoral 
victory on 9 June 1983, as Thatcher convinced a majority of the British public to support 
the pillar of her defense initiative, the placement of INF in the UK and Western Europe.  
However, events transpiring in a small nation of the British Commonwealth in the 
Caribbean were to cause Thatcher a great deal of personal and political difficulties in this 
regard. 
Britain’s relationship with Grenada began in 1763 when the island was acquired 
from France as a part of the Treaty of Paris ending the Seven Years War.  The island 
quickly attracted British planters who focused the island’s production on sugar.  The 
incessant abuse of slave labor ensured that Grenada became Britain’s second most 
valuable colony in the West Indies after Jamaica.117  The British and French continued to 
struggle for mastery over the island, and a French-supported slave revolt, led by 
Grenadian native Julien Fedon, almost succeeded in driving the British from the island in 
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1795.  Fedon died during the unsuccessful revolt, but remained a national hero long after 
death, especially following the rise of the People’s Revolutionary Government in 1979.118 
Grenada’s importance to the British Empire waned with the introduction of free 
trade principles to Britain’s sugar market in the early 1800s.  The loss of tariff protections 
caused Grenada’s sugar plantations to fail as cheaper Brazilian and Cuban sugar drove 
the Grenadians from the market, resulting in the abandonment of forty-seven sugar 
estates on Grenada by 1856.119  British plantation owners fled the economic doldrums of 
Grenada for more secure sources of revenue elsewhere.  However, this economic setback 
combined with the abolition of slavery in 1834 provided cheap farmland for newly-freed 
slaves.  Unlike their previous masters, these Grenadians were content with subsistence 
farming as long as they were free.  Thus a strong feeling of independence and self-worth 
permeated Grenadian society, and demonstrated itself in strong and continuous calls for 
self-government until Britain granted Grenada independence in 1974.120 
The leader of Grenada’s independence movement from the 1950s onwards was 
Eric Gairy. Much of Grenada’s population still depended on plantation work, but the 
British colonial authorities kept these unskilled workers from unionizing and agitating for 
higher wages and better working conditions.  Low wages and a lack of representation 
resulted in great unrest among Grenada’s rural poor.  Eric Gairy organized peasants and 
unskilled workers into two trade unions, the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union 
and the Grenada United Labor Party (GULP).  The British colonial authorities and the 
plantation owners refused to recognize these trade unions, and as a result, Gairy led 
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impoverished workers from cocoa and nutmeg plantations into St. George’s, Grenada’s 
capital, to call a strike and demand recognition on 19 February 1951.121  The strike 
brought about a significant rise in wages, as well as the emergence of the trade unions as 
political players.  Gairy used the political arm of the GULP to gain control of the 
Legislative Council in the 1951 election, the first to be conducted under conditions of 
universal suffrage.122  Gairy continued to lead the Legislative Council for most of the 
years leading up to 1974.  On 7 February 1974, Gairy led Grenada into complete 
independence from Britain, but ensured that Grenada remained a member of the British 
Commonwealth. 
Gairy’s regime faced criticism on several fronts.  His regime was corrupt and 
repressed opposition through brutal retribution from the secret police, the “Mongoose 
Gang.”  Gairy “was diverting government funds to his private ventures… while the 
public sector of the economy was virtually starved during the last twelve years of his 
reign.”123  Additionally, “the prime minister, who believed in witchcraft, UFO’s, and 
dreams, viewed any kind of education as a potential threat to his corrupt and bizarre 
rule.”124  Gairy’s repressive and authoritarian regime inspired large levels of opposition, 
which eventually coalesced into the New Jewel Movement (NJM) in 1973.   
A British-trained lawyer named Maurice Bishop, heavily influenced by the Black 
Power movement, led the new party.  Under Bishop’s leadership, the NJM expanded its 
core principles of “racial and national pride, Rastafarianism, ‘popular power’ and 
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‘participatory democracy,’” to include elements of socialist and Marxist theory.125  
Terrible economic conditions, limited individual freedoms, and the constant threat of 
terrorization at the hands of the “Mongooses” led many lower and middle class 
Grenadians to support the NJM.  The NJM decided that “parliamentary democracy in a 
deeply corrupt political system could not defeat Gairy and that force was the only 
answer.”126  An opportunity to overthrow the Gairy regime arose on 13 March 1979 
while Prime Minister Gairy was at the UN calling for the creation of “a UN agency to 
investigate cosmic phenomena” and UFOs.127  Under the direction of Bishop, Hudson 
Austin, and Bernard Coard, the NJM overthrew Gairy’s regime and established the 
People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG).  
Both Washington D.C. and London demonstrated a distinct disinterest in the 
Grenadian revolution of 1979.  During the Cabinet Meeting following the coup, James 
Callaghan’s Labour government stated that “it was clearly not our policy to get involved 
in the internal affairs of other members of the Commonwealth.”  The Cabinet decided 
that “we should do everything possible to avoid becoming entangled in arguments over 
Grenada,” and ensured that “there was no intention to intervene in Grenada.”128  
President Carter’s administration responded in a similar manner to the British.  Brian 
Meeks points to several reasons for the low level of interest shown by President Carter’s 
administration.  Meeks believes that “the English-speaking islands of the Eastern 
Caribbean were still extricating themselves from British colonialism and had therefore 
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not been fully incorporated into the American geopolitical picture.”129  Additionally, the 
human rights violations of the Gairy regime surely soured Carter’s feelings towards the 
overthrown government.  Carter’s administration thus recognized Bishop’s new 
government within ten days of the revolution.130  Carter’s lack of interest in Grenada’s 
revolution as well as his previously weak foreign policy resulted in the creation of a 
“permissive world context” in which the Grenadian revolution could succeed without 
worry of US interference.131 
However, the Carter administration feared the fostering of close ties between 
Cuba and Grenada following the revolution, but enraged the PRG by failing to send 
bilateral assistance to Grenada.  American fears increased after “a Cuban ship… pulled 
into St. George’s harbor and begun unloading crates that the U.S. government [believed] 
were arms and ammunition.”132  However, the Carter administration believed that 
“economic and social instability” represented a greater threat to the Caribbean than any 
Cuban military assistance.  Carter stated that “we will increase our economic assistance 
to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further 
ensure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible communist 
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domination.”133  While Carter looked to prevent further socialist revolutions in the 
Caribbean through economic assistance, President Reagan sought to reclaim lost ground 
whenever possible.  The Grenadian Revolution thus played a pivotal role “in bringing 
Carter’s foreign policy into question and in returning the US to a more traditional 
hegemonic policy.”134 
President Reagan understood foreign policy, and thus the situation in Grenada, 
much differently than Carter.  Robert Pastor believes that “the Reagan administration 
viewed the problems of the Caribbean Basin strictly in terms of the East-West struggle, 
and therefore U.S. policy toward Grenada was important for what it told the world about 
U.S. determination to confront communism.”135  Pastor contrasts the views of Reagan 
and Carter nicely by stating that “whereas the Carter administration viewed Grenada as a 
small, radical problem in the Easter Caribbean, the Reagan administration approached 
Grenada as a small object in a larger East-West struggle.”136   
Reagan blamed Carter for allowing the revolutionary government to take hold in 
Grenada, and revealed his keen interest in the island during a speech he gave on 10 
March 1983 to the National Association of Manufacturers.  He highlighted the danger 
radical governments posed to US trade via the Panama Canal and other sea lanes, but also 
focused on the threat to America’s national security.  While he focused his speech on US 
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efforts in El Salvador, he mentioned several other “governments seizing power… with 
ideological and military ties to the Soviet Union,” including Grenada.137  He stated that: 
Grenada, that tiny little island -- with Cuba at the west end of the Caribbean, 
Grenada at the east end -- that tiny little island is building now, or having built for 
it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and 
facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks, and training grounds for the 
military. I'm sure all of that is simply to encourage the export of nutmeg.  People 
who make these arguments haven't taken a good look at a map lately or followed 
the extraordinary buildup of Soviet and Cuban military power in the region or 
read the Soviets’ discussions about why the region is important to them and how 
they intend to use it.  It isn't nutmeg that's at stake in the Caribbean and Central 
America; it is the United States national security.138 
 
Reagan returned to Grenada’s new runway construction during his “Star Wars” 
speech on 23 March 1983.  Reagan outlined several defense initiatives to the nation, 
including the planned deployment of cruise missiles in Britain and Western Europe, as 
necessary to get the Soviet Union to the negotiating table.  Reagan declared that “we will 
begin [cruise] deployment late this year. At the same time, however, we're willing to 
cancel our program if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we've called a zero-
zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating table -- and I think it's fair to say that 
without our planned deployments, they wouldn't be there.”139  Revealing the proximity of 
the Soviet threat, Reagan also showed several photographs highlighting Soviet activity in 
Central America and the Caribbean.  The fourth photograph he held up revealed the 
ongoing construction of the Grenadian airfield.  Reagan warned that: 
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On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the 
Cubans, with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building an 
airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who 
is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our 
international commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of 
all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid buildup of 
Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island 
country of under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of other 
eastern Caribbean States, most of which are unarmed.  The Soviet-Cuban 
militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the 
region.140 
 
President Reagan thus clearly believed that Grenada represented a key piece in the global 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Bishop and the NJM sought to gain support within the United States, and “one 
important element of the New Jewel strategy was an attempt to draw the Reagan 
administration into open controversy over Grenada, as a means of polarizing American 
opinion and generating support for the New Jewel Regime among U.S. liberals.”141  The 
Grenadians had three objectives in their public relations push in America: “To mobilize 
public opinion (including in Congress) in order to restrain the U.S. Government from 
attacking Grenada militarily; To win long-term contacts and sympathy for Grenada, 
hence turning attacks to our advantage; To solicit assistance: paper, tape recorders, 
typewriters, etc.”142  Reagan’s speech thus presented an opportunity for Bishop and his 
regime to highlight the danger of Reagan’s rhetoric and American imperialism to 
Grenada’s government.  The NJM conducted an extensive media outreach throughout 
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1983 in order to “counter attack President Reagan’s verbal attack on Grenada.”143  The 
NJM used radio interviews with urban stations as well as appearances with members of 
the Congressional Black Caucus.  The NJM ultimately sought “a broad and continuous 
propaganda campaign that always keeps our revolution in the minds of North 
America.”144 
 Maurice Bishop and the PRG believed that they could resist American efforts to 
impose hegemony over Grenada.  Bishop successfully attracted western capital as “the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had given their ringing endorsement to 
the policies followed by the PRG in the economic arena.”145  Brian Meeks believes that 
“flawed as it was, the Grenadian revolution, as Maurice Bishop’s successful 1983 trip to 
the US showed, was becoming a dangerous model of an alternative approach to 
development and, more, of successful resistance to US hegemony in what is usually 
considered in Washington a US lake.”146  Thus, to Reagan and his foreign policy 
objectives, “the success or failure of Grenada lay to a degree at the cutting-edge of the 
struggle against communism.”147 
 While Bishop and the PRG attempted to present an image of “genial 
accommodation with the United States,” documents captured following the invasion of 
Grenada reveal “a profoundly orthodox Marxist-Leninist leader.”148  Throughout his 
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leadership of the PRG, Bishop “was devising long-term strategies for full socialization of 
the Grenadian economy and its coordination with the ‘Socialist’ economic world.”149  
Bishop explained the PRG’s economic policies during his “Line of March” speech on 13 
September 1982.  He sought to explain “the economic essence in the non-capitalist path 
of economic development, or more precisely the path of socialist orientation.”150  This 
socialist orientation of the economy relied on the dominance of the public (state) sector.  
Bishop stated that “we must assume total control of all financial institutions… all foreign 
trade… all Public Utilities… all aspects of infrastructure.”151  In order to accomplish 
these goals Bishop believed that the government “must develop central planning 
mechanisms for the economy and the society as a whole.”152  Bishop understood that in 
order to achieve a strong state-run economy, Grenada must first develop its economy 
along capitalist principles.  He declared that “simultaneously we will be nurturing the 
shoots of capitalism and the shoots of socialism and the question is which one becomes 
predominant and how you control and ensure that socialism is what comes out and not 
capitalism.”153  As will be seen, Bishop’s fellow members of the PRG eventually decided 
that Bishop’s capitalistic economic policies had betrayed the revolution and failed to 
ensure socialism’s eventual success on Grenada. 
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Bishop, like Gairy before him, also brutalized his people.  In his “Line of March” 
speech, Bishop outlined his understanding of both the state and governance.  Bishop 
declared that “the state came about in the first case; so that there would be a dictatorship 
and a minority, in the case of the capitalist state, would crush and oppress the majority.  
In the case of the Socialist State, the majority will crush, oppress and repress the 
recalitrant (sic) minority.”154  Bishop described the legislative process under the PRG as 
an oligarchic process with the Cabinet’s approval, Bishop’s signature, and then “that is 
what everybody in the country – like it or don’t like it – has to follow.”155  For those who 
“don’t like it,” Bishop stated that “you get detained when I sign an order after discussing 
it with the National Security Committee of the Part or with a higher Party body.  Once I 
sign it – like it or don’t like it – its up the hill for them.”156   
Russell Budhlall outlined the treatment experienced by both common and political 
prisoners sent “up the hill” in a complaint to his lawyer on 30 September 1980.  He 
claimed that “I was beaten on my abdomen and I received punch, kick and they beat me 
with Gun butt.  They had an instrument burning me with.  They burn me all different 
parts of my body and then push it up through my bottom… I receive a kick on my face 
and I bleed through my nostrils.”157  Bishop clearly operated a dictatorial and repressive 
regime, which in part explains the exuberant response the majority of Grenadians 
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expressed following the American invasion in October 1983, although other Grenadians 
approved the invasion for bringing justice to Bishop’s executioners. 
While Bishop operated a Marxist-Leninist government, several fellow members 
of the PRG, led by Bernard Coard, attacked Bishop for abandoning the revolution and 
focusing too much on “petit bourgeois” interests.  Bishop wanted to build Grenada’s 
economy and industrial base through capitalism (thus the appeals to the World Bank and 
IMF), but with the understanding that the state would eventually nationalize all 
industries.  He therefore sought to walk a “tight rope” by developing the economy 
through capitalistic means and society through socialism.158  Bernard and Phyllis Coard 
and several other members of the PRG, believed this “tight rope” development betrayed 
the PRG’s Marxist foundation and thus overthrew Bishop on 13 October 1983.  Tension 
“mixed with fear and foreboding” permeated the public’s attitude following Bishop’s 
house arrest.159  Despite his brutal rule, Bishop remained a popular figure for some 
Grenadians.  On 19 October, a large crowd marched to Bishop’s house and freed him.  
Bishop and the crowd proceeded to Fort Rupert in an effort to address the nation via the 
army transmitter.  Shortly thereafter, a contingent of the People’s Revolutionary Army 
(PRA) arrived at Fort Rupert and fired into the crowd of Bishop’s supporters, killing 
scores and dispersing the mob.  Bishop was found by the PRA and executed.160 
The execution of Maurice Bishop led to the dissolution of the PRG and the 
establishment of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) under the direction of 
General Austin.  The RMC enforced a four-day-long curfew in which government troops 
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shot anyone in public on sight.161  It also sought to assuage both its allies and critics in 
the international community.  The Cuban government had condemned Bishop’s 
execution and stated that “no doctrine, no principle, no opinion calling itself 
revolutionary, and no internal split can justify such atrocious acts as the physical 
elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and dignified leaders who died 
yesterday.”162  General Austin also visited the American students in the medical school at 
St. George’s University and “gave his assurance that they would not be harmed and that 
anyone who wanted to leave could do so.”163  On 19 October the People’s Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (PRAF) issued a statement to the international community:  
The lives and property of all foreign citizens are fully protected and guaranteed.  
The Revolutionary military Council hereby declares that any attempt at foreign 
aggression will be resisted by the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces to the 
last man and calls upon all countries to respect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Grenada and to strictly adhere to the international legal principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.164   
 
Some semblance of normalcy had returned to the island by 25 October, until the sound of 
American helicopters began to reverberate throughout the island. 
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III.  A “CONSCIOUS CONCEALMENT OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS:” 
PRESIDENT REAGAN’S DECISION TO INVADE GRENADA 
 
Democracies do not, with very few exceptions, start wars. 
- Margaret Thatcher165 
 
President Reagan decided to invade Grenada in the early hours of 22 October, 
following the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) that 
America lead an invasion to stabilize the region.  A Marine task force en route to 
Lebanon to replace the Marines stationed there had already been diverted to the 
Caribbean to join the USS Independence carrier group on 20 October.  Secretary of State 
Shultz and several other cabinet members believed that “conditions were ripe… for 
hostage taking” in Grenada.166  The Iranian hostage crisis still dominated the memory of 
many Americans, especially those in the President’s cabinet who recognized the crisis’ 
devastating impact on Carter’s presidency.  Such a situation could not arise again.  Thus 
the US quickly accepted the decision of the OECS “to intervene by force in Grenada if 
the United States would assist them.”167   
However, the Americans encouraged the OECS to request assistance and had 
been in contact with the OECS prior to the meeting on 21 October when the decision to 
seek US military assistance was made.  Gary Williams notes that “according to some 
sources the US ambassador to Barbados Milan Bish and Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Gillespie were present at the meeting to 
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encourage the OECS to make the request.”168  While this evidence would seem to support 
claims made both today and in 1983 that the OECS acted as a puppet of the US 
government, both Gary Williams and Patsy Lewis believe the OECS acted in its own 
self-interest.  Grenada represented a confluence of both American and OECS interests.  
The OECS provided President Reagan with the legal justification to invade Grenada, and 
the United States offered the OECS the military strength necessary to eliminate a 
potential national security threat in its infancy.169  Thus, according to Williams, the 
OECS’ leaders played an important role in ensuring US intervention in Grenada.  He 
states that while “the United States did not act solely because of the OECS request it was 
the OECS’ willingness to act that facilitated a military solution.”170 
Reagan described the fear felt by the OECS countries that “unless they were 
stopped… it was just a matter of time before the Grenadians and Castro moved on their 
countries.”171  The OECS stated that: 
Member Governments are also greatly concerned that the extensive 
military build up in Grenada over the last few years had created a situation 
of disproportionate military strength between Grenada and other OECS 
countries.  This military might in the hands of the present group posed a 
serious threat to the security of the OECS countries and other neighboring 
States.  Member Governments considered it of the utmost urgency that 
immediate steps should be taken to remove this threat.172 
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As a result of this fear, Reagan believed that “we couldn’t say no to those six small 
countries who had asked us for help.  We’d have no credibility or standing in the 
Americas if we did.  If it ever became known… that we had turned them down, few of 
our friends around the world would trust us completely as an ally again.”173  While the 
OECS treaty allowed the heads of government to make “arrangements for collective 
security against external aggression” under Article 8, it made no mention of how the 
OECS could respond to internal threats, such as the coup in Grenada.174 The OECS 
believed Grenada had the potential to become an external threat to the other OECS 
members, thus their decision represented a preemptive strike of sorts.  However, not all 
countries believed the situation in Grenada warranted an armed response, Britain 
included. 
Following the execution of Bishop by the PRAF, the British government 
responded cautiously.  The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Howe ordered the 
deployment of HMS Antrim to Grenada to safeguard British citizens if the situation on 
the island deteriorated, but both were “anxious that we should not be seen to be over-
reacting.”175  During the Cabinet meeting on October 22, the coup in Grenada occupied 
little attention.  Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Howe viewed Coard’s assumption 
of power as a fait accompli and noted that “the new regime was likely to be even more 
Marxist/Leninist than its predecessor.”176  Howe later stated that the British government 
“had learned to refrain from post-imperial intervention in the affairs of several newborn 
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Commonwealth states.”177  The evolving political landscape in countries such as Guyana, 
Uganda, and Grenada was “no longer directly our business… but we remained, of course, 
concerned.”178  While the British government sought to avoid any drastic action in 
Grenada (especially considering the proximity of INF deployment in the UK), Thatcher 
and Howe had to consider the opinions of the Caribbean Commonwealth nations. 
Seven Caribbean Commonwealth nations, including Grenada, composed the 
membership of the OECS.  These nations sought assistance from the US, not the UK, in 
restoring peace and democracy to Grenada.  At a meeting in Barbados on 21 October 
1983, the group unanimously “took the momentous decision to ask the United States to 
lead and organise a joint US-Commonwealth Caribbean invasion of Grenada.”179  The 
British government received notification of the request, as they were also verbally asked 
to join the multi-national force, but Reagan failed to inform Thatcher of his decision to 
agree to the request for military intervention.  Following the National Security Council 
meeting on the morning of 22 October, Ambassador Wright received word from US 
Admiral Howe that “the conclusion of the NSC meeting was that the U.S. should proceed 
very cautiously.”180  However, the meeting’s participants had actually affirmed President 
Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada and “according to one anonymous participant, 
‘everyone was gung-ho.’”181 Admiral Howe nonetheless insisted that “the Americans 
have made no decisions going beyond these contingency deployments,” and that “no 
decision had yet been made on how to respond” to the OECS request.  Admiral Howe 
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further “assured us that there would be consultation if the Americans decided to take any 
further steps.”182   
The British High Commissioner to Barbados Sir Giles Bullard corresponded at 
length with the FCO concerning decisions taken by the OECS and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) concerning Grenada.  Geoffrey Howe requested his advice on 
several matters following the OECS’s decision to request military assistance.  Howe 
believed that the British government “may be faced shortly with choices involving 
participation in or acceptance of plans for military action without other possibilities 
having been fully explored.”183  He thus sought advice on the chance of a diplomatic 
solution succeeding in restoring constitutional government in Grenada.  Bullard 
responded that Coard and Austin “could well undertake to hold elections and restore 
constitutional government, knowing that the longer [military] intervention is delayed the 
more difficult it will become.  But from what I have head from Coard and Austin they 
might not honour their undertakings.”184  Additionally, the Commonwealth Caribbean 
nations had been deeply shocked by the execution of Maurice Bishop and were thus 
unlikely “to promote or go along with any attempt by a third party to promote 
negotiations with the military council.”185  Thus no real political or diplomatic solution 
appeared feasible.  Instead, Bullard advised the British government to allow the OECS 
and Caribbean Commonwealth to take the lead in deciding what should be done 
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concerning Grenada.  Bullard admitted his surprise at having been “asked to intervene 
militarily in the internal affairs of a Caribbean country,” and had “doubts as to how it will 
turn out, if the Americans master mind it.”  However, he stated that: 
People like Adams, Compton and Miss Charles (I do not know Seaga or 
Chamber) are commonsense politicians with considerable experience, and very 
far from being hawks.  They are I think the best judges of how to handle the 
problem presented by the military coup in Grenada.  If they and their CARICOM 
colleagues come out in favour of a multi-national force and if the US supports the 
idea I recommend we should give our support too or at the very least take no steps 
that might weaken the operation.186 
 
While Bullard supported the decision to take military action against the coup’s 
leaders in Grenada, the British government refused to support or oppose military actions 
until it received a formal, written request to join the international military force.  The 
Prime Minister and Geoffrey Howe continued to receive conflicting messages on the 
likelihood of military intervention in Grenada.  In his memoirs, Howe described the 
government’s confusion as the result of three sources of information on Grenada.  The 
OECS had voted for military intervention “and to seek help from friendly governments, 
including our own,” yet “the promised formal request… never reached us.”187  After the 
US invasion, both Howe and Thatcher insisted no formal request had been made to the 
British government, but British high commissioner Bullard received a formal request on 
22 October as recorded by the Foreign Office: “The request to Britain was made orally 
but formally to our High Commissioner later that day.”188  Howe and Thatcher correctly 
reported no reception of a written, formal request, but the British government received a 
formal request for assistance nonetheless.   
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The CARICOM meeting, on the other hand, had decided “in favour of sanctions 
rather than military action.”189  Additionally, the deputy high commissioner to Barbados 
had visited Grenada on 23 October and reported no imminent threat to the foreign 
population on the island.  He also reported no request from Sir Paul Scoon, the British 
Governor General in Grenada, “for help of any kind either to the deputy high 
commissioner or direct by telephone to Buckingham Palace, with which he had been in 
touch on the same day [23 October].”190  Howe used this information from the Caribbean 
along with the assurances from the United States that no military decision would be made 
without further consultation with the British government to prepare for his remarks to the 
House on 24 October. 
Howe steadfastly denied the likelihood of any American military action in 
Grenada during his appearance in the Commons on 24 October.  Denis Healey, the 
shadow Foreign Secretary, asked, “Can the Foreign Secretary assure us that there is no 
question of American military intervention on the island?  It could only make matters 
worse.”191  Howe stated plainly that he knew “of no such intention.”  Asked repeatedly 
by other MPs on US intentions Howe insisted that “I have no reason to think that 
American military intervention is likely,” and again that “the presence of the United 
States naval vessels is not prompted by the consideration [military intervention] that the 
hon. Gentleman has in mind.”192   
However, some MPs supported military action in Grenada.  Conservative MP 
Peter Tapsell asked Howe if he was “aware of the widespread belief in the Caribbean 
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during the past two or three years that Grenada should be regarded as part of a Soviet 
game-plan, and the new airports as a jumping-off ground aimed primarily at Trinidad and 
Venezuela?”  Tapsell and other MPs thus considered the situation in a similar way to 
President Reagan, and contended that the British government “should see the incident as 
a serious development in the global struggle for power and not just as an isolated seizure 
of power by a group of the military.”193  Howe, on the other hand, believed that the 
situation in Grenada had not changed significantly since Prime Minister Bishop had 
forged close relationships with Cuba and other Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe.  The 
Foreign Secretary also pushed back against the suggestion made by MP Russell Johnston 
that as the leader of the Commonwealth, the British had a responsibility to aid the 
Grenadians.194  Howe reiterated that Grenada was an independent country and as a result 
“our concern and what we are prepared to do about it must be determined by recognition 
of that fact.”195 
While Howe claimed before Parliament and later in his memoirs that his 
testimony on 24 October before Parliament was accurate, the evidence suggests his 
testimony was also naïve, and potentially misleading.  On 23 October, reports arrived 
concerning Jamaican troop transfers to Barbados.196  Bullard reported the arrival of 
American helicopters at Barbados as well.197  Additionally, Howe’s own words seem to 
discredit his statements in Parliament.  Howe sent a telegram on 23 October at 2:50 PM, 
prior to his appearance in the House of Commons forty minutes later, stating that 
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“although the Americans have undertaken to consult us I am concerned at the possibility 
that they might be moving towards early direct intervention in Grenada.”198  If Howe had 
such reservations prior to his Parliamentary appearance, his repeated statements casting 
doubt on the likelihood of US military intervention seem unfounded.  His statements in 
Parliament could be seen as an overestimation of Britain’s ability to influence America’s 
foreign policy, or alternatively as an attempt to avoid an international incident that could 
arise from his suggestion of an impending US invasion of Grenada. 
 Despite his concerns that the Americans were considering imminent military 
action in Grenada, Howe attempted to sway American opinion.  He instructed 
Ambassador Wright to convey to the American government his concerns.  He stated that: 
I and my colleagues see no grounds on which military intervention could be 
justified internationally unless it were required to protect lives.  This does not at 
present seem to be the case.  Furthermore there is no organisation in Grenada with 
which an invading force could work.  Extrication could be difficult and lives 
would be at risk both during an operation and subsequently.  Western intervention 
would be misrepresented in propaganda with damaging effect.199 
 
The British government instead advised the use of political and economic pressure to 
pressure the PRG into reforming itself.  Additionally, Howe requested that the Americans 
not make Governor General Scoon “the focal point of any form of outside intervention.  I 
see his role as possibly being crucial at a later stage provided that his position is not 
prejudiced now.”200 
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 Despite British misgivings, Reagan informed Thatcher shortly before 7 PM on 24 
October that “I am giving serious consideration to the OECS request.”201  Reagan also 
stated that “Her Majesty’s Governor General in Grenada could be a key figure in this 
operation, since he is the only remaining voice of legitimacy on the island and should be 
the one who designates a new provisional government.”  He further told Thatcher that “I 
welcome your thoughts on these matters.  I know that you would want to be kept 
informed of any role the United States may decide to play in support of the island nations 
of the Caribbean.”  As a result, he stated that he would “undertake to inform you in 
advance should our forces take part in the proposed collective security force, or of 
whatever political or diplomatic efforts we plan to pursue.”  The Prime Minister, 
believing she had been genuinely consulted, drafted a careful reply to the President 
reminding him of the British government’s continued misgivings, especially from the 
perspective of justifying the invasion to the international community.  She also expressed 
concern regarding the potential use of Britain’s Governor General as a focal point for a 
new government, which would put his life in danger and involve HMG in American 
intrigues.202  However, the draft never reached Reagan since his message confirming 
America’s planned military invasion arrived just hours after his initial message “seeking 
advice” from Thatcher. 
 In his message to Margaret Thatcher at 10 PM, Reagan “informed” the Prime 
Minister of his proposed invasion, negating his earlier message seeking advice since 
Thatcher never had the chance to reply.  Reagan refused to use apologetic language, 
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instead informing Thatcher that “the United Kingdom can play an important role in 
strengthening the new government’s position by offering political support and by 
providing a program of economic assistance.”203  The Prime Minister did not take well to 
being informed instead of consulted, and let it be known in the opening line of her reply.  
She stated that “I was about to reply to your earlier message inviting my thoughts when 
your second one arrived.  I must tell you at once that the decision which you describe 
causes us the greatest concern.”204  She doubted the validity of America’s argument that 
it was acting to protect its citizens since American lives were not currently endangered 
and would only become so during the chaos of an invasion.   
Thatcher also criticized the proposed US invasion on the grounds that “this action 
will be seen as intervention by a Western Democratic country in the internal affairs of a 
small independent nation, however unattractive its regime.”  She revealed Britain’s 
greatest objection to Reagan’s proposed invasion when she asked the President “to 
consider this in the context of our wider East/West relations and of the fact that we will 
be having in the next few days to present to our Parliament and people the siting of 
Cruise missiles in this country.”  American belligerency in Grenada, and its rejection of 
British consultation, would give credence to arguments that the United States could not 
be trusted to base its weapons in the United Kingdom.  Due to the threat America’s action 
could have on the proposed deployment of INF, Thatched told Reagan that “I am deeply 
disturbed by your latest communication.  You asked for my advice.  I have set it out and 
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hope that even at this late stage you will take it into account before events are 
irrevocable.”205   
Shortly after sending her message, the Prime Minister phoned the President 
requesting further deliberation prior to any Americana action, but Reagan explained the 
“zero-hour” had already passed.  Furthermore, he doubted the effectiveness of Thatcher’s 
Grenadian strategy.  Reagan believed that “relying upon economic and political sanctions 
would provide time for Cuba and the Soviet Union to consolidate the position of the new 
regime.”206  No amount of pressure or advice from the Prime Minister could change the 
President’s mind.  The US would invade Grenada, and the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary would face an incensed Parliament and press later in the day, seeking answers 
to America’s deceptive behavior towards its supposedly closest ally. 
On the morning of 25 October, President Reagan addressed the nation on the 
American invasion of Grenada.  He justified the invasion with three points:  
First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to a 
thousand Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern.  
Second, to forestall further chaos.  And third, to assist in the restoration of 
conditions of law and order of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, 
where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime 
Minister, three Cabinet members, two labor leaders, and other civilians, including 
children.207 
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Reagan presented the speech with Eugenia Charles, the Prime Minister of Dominica, 
which provided further legitimacy to his claim to be responding primarily to a legal 
request from the OECS for military assistance.   
Margaret Thatcher’s response to the American invasion in Parliament and the 
press revolved around two objectives.  As she stated: 
I needed to ensure that whatever short-term difficulties we had with the United 
States, the long-term relationship between our two countries, on which I knew 
Britain’s security and the free West’s interests depended, would not be damaged.  
I was equally determined that international law should be respected and that 
relations between states should not be allowed to degenerate into a game of 
realpolitik played out between contesting power blocs.208   
 
Thatcher thus decided to maintain a neutral position on Grenada before the public and 
Parliament in the immediate aftermath of America’s invasion.  
The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary faced an incredulous Parliament on 25 
October as they had to report the American invasion, which just hours before had been 
“unlikely.”  The Prime Minister’s usual question and answer time was interrupted to 
address the situation in Grenada.  She gave no indication at that time of her anger at being 
deceived by the President.  Instead she presented a balanced response to the American 
invasion, giving neither support nor condemnation.  She explained that the US gave 
greater consideration to the opinions and requests of the OECS nations than to British 
concerns.  The issue of cruise deployment also came up during the question and answer 
time.  MP Enoch Powell attempted to draw a correlation between Grenada and the 
placement of cruise missiles in the UK, stating that “no undertakings that may be offered 
by the United States – either as to the use that it might make of missiles stationed in this 
country or as to the consultation that would precede such use – ought to be relied 
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upon.”209  The Prime Minister insisted that “there is no parallel at all” between American 
action in Grenada and the potential use of cruise missiles without British consultation.210   
Howe also refused to condemn or support the American invasion, instead 
reminding the Commons that “there is room for two views on this matter.”211  Dennis 
Healey described Howe’s handling of the Grenada situation and his apparently 
misinformed testimony the previous day as giving an “impression of pitiable impotence 
by a British Foreign Secretary.”212  As will be seen in the next chapter, Healey caused 
Howe to quickly shift from defending the government’s handling of Grenada to 
defending the government’s proposed stationing of American cruise missiles in the UK.  
President Reagan had put the British government in an awkward position.  The 
government had to argue that consultation would occur prior to any American decision to 
launch UK-based cruise missiles, while also explaining the source of the government 
misinformation on Grenada – a lack of American consultation. 
While the Grenada affair quickly came to revolve around issues of British 
sovereignty and control over American-operated cruise missiles, events on the island 
itself were resolved quickly and positively.  President Reagan invaded Grenada to 
remove a threat, restore democracy and good relations with surrounding countries, and 
protect American lives.  Unlike the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with which the 
American invasion often received comparison, the Americans had no intention of setting 
up a puppet government or establishing imperial sovereignty.  Despite the questions of 
legality, the American public widely accepted the merits of the invasion.  Secretary of 
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State Shultz attributed this acceptance to the reaction of evacuated American medical 
students.  He acknowledged that “we were all aware that how those students behaved and 
what they said to the media would greatly affect how the intervention in Grenada would 
be perceived in the United States.”213  The first student off the plane “fell to his knees and 
kissed the tarmac… The TV anchorman kept trying to push the students to say that they 
were never in danger; it didn’t work.  Suddenly I could sense the country’s emotions turn 
around.”214  Shultz thus believed that the country felt “our effort in Grenada wasn’t an 
immoral imperialist intervention: it was an essential rescue and a job well done.”215 
In addition to the reaction of the American students, the discovery of large 
amounts of military hardware and hundreds of documents detailing arms negotiations 
with Eastern Bloc nations seemed to justify Reagan’s warning regarding Grenada’s threat 
to both American and OECS security.216  Upon invading, the Americans discovered that 
“nearly 900 Cuban, Libyan, Soviet, North Korean, East German and Bulgarian personnel 
were in Grenada to assist in the transformation of the island into a major military 
camp.”217  The PRA also sought “to expand their army to a total of four regular and 
fourteen reserve battalions by 1985,” which “would have placed as much as 15-25 
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percent of the entire Grenadian population under arms.”218  President Reagan quickly 
used pictures of this captured military hardware to justify the invasion.  He showed 
pictures of several warehouses containing “weapons and ammunition stacked almost to 
the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists.”  He went on to proclaim that 
“Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism.  Well it wasn’t.  It 
was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and 
undermine democracy.  We got there just in time.”219  Other commentators, however, 
believed that “apart from anti-aircraft weapons, the arms were not all that impressive at 
first glance and, to some, seemed not much more than might be trawled from a Texas 
suburb.”220  The documented evidence of weapons stockpiles and planned purchases 
seems to suggest that while Grenada’s threat to the United States would only have come 
with the potential stationing of Soviet bombers at its newly constructed airbase, its threat 
to the immediate region could have been considerable. 
The greatest “success” of American intervention in Grenada was the favorable 
response of the Grenadian people.  The fighting ended quickly with limited bloodshed, 
and a new provisional government came to power under the leadership of the Governor 
General, Sir Paul Scoon, who promised and provided for early elections in 1984.  The 
relatives of slain NJM leaders, including the mothers of Bishop and Education Minister 
Jacqueline Creft, welcomed the invasion.  As reported in the Times, Alimenta Bishop 
stated, “I don’t know about what Maurice would have said.  But we were very happy…  
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We didn’t know what was going to happen – all these guys running around with guns 
killing people.”221  Mr. Allan Creft declared that “we don’t consider it an invasion.  It 
was a rescue operation.”222  Other reporters described the American soldiers as being 
“embraced as liberators.”223  Additionally, a poll of Grenadian citizens conducted shortly 
after the invasion found that “85 percent of Grenadians welcomed the intervention not as 
an invasion but as a rescue mission.”224  While the reliability of polls can be debated on 
several fronts, the reactions of the vast majority of the Grenadian population towards the 
US intervention appeared positive. 
Despite the beneficial outcome of US action in Grenada for its people and the 
region, the British and many others firmly believed that the ends failed to justify the 
means.  As Thatcher later stated in a BBC World Service phone-in on 30 October, “I 
think as a general rule we in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our 
force to defend our way of life, we do not use it to walk into other people’s countries 
independent sovereign territories, we try to extend our beliefs not by force but by 
persuasion.”225  Geoffrey Howe explained that “the British view… was flatly and 
instinctively opposed to the idea that Britain, the former colonial power, should appear to 
threaten the independence of another Commonwealth nation by taking military action 
against a government of which it disproved.”226  On the other hand, the United States also 
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should have abstained from taking military action in Grenada since “world opinion was 
ranged against the Soviet Union for having attempted just that in Afghanistan.”227  
Ultimately, Howe primarily criticized the lack of American consultation.  He believed 
that “what had taken place went beyond lack of consultation and involved apparently 
conscious concealment of American intentions.”228  At the time, however, Howe kept his 
criticism leveled at America’s failure to adequately consult Britain, accusations of willful 
deception during the tumultuous deployment of American cruise missiles could have 
further damaged the likelihood of a successful deployment of INF. 
Ambassador Wright attempted to explain the lack of consultation surrounding the 
Grenada affair in a message to Howe on 30 October 1983.  He explained that 
The lesson of consultation is not necessarily that the Americans will ride 
roughshod over us whenever they decide that it is in their interests to do so.  Nor 
do I place much reliance on the President’s or the Secretary’s promise of 
improved performance.  In my view, their judgement of the American interest will 
prevail in the future as in the past.  That being so, the lesson for us is that, if we 
wish to be consulted, we have so to conduct our affairs that it is necessary for 
them to do so.  In the NATO alliance consultation is necessary since decisions are 
taken by consensus.  Consultation on INF has been exemplary because 
deployment could not have taken place unless it had been so.229 
 
Clearly Wright doubted that Grenada represented a shift in Anglo-American relations.  
Just as the two nations had previously disagreed over policy, they were bound to do so 
again.  Britain must decide where to expend its resources to position itself as an 
irreplaceable ally of the United States.  Otherwise, close consultation between the two 
governments would arise only in issues relating to NATO or Europe.  Britain could only 
expect close consultation in regions containing British interests and influence. 
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However, questions remained for the Prime Minister.  In a conversation with 
Charles Douglas-Home, The Times editor, on 29 October, the Prime Minister’s private 
secretary David Barclay recorded that “the Prime Minister expressed concern about the 
longer term effects of the American action.  She had always argued that there was an 
essential distinction between the Soviet Union and NATO, in that the Soviet Union was 
an aggressive power whereas NATO was purely defensive, working to extend democracy 
in the world, but not by force.  That argument was no longer so convincing.”230  For 
Thatcher, “the fundamental question… was whether Grenada could be treated as a 
difficult but isolated incident, as she would hope, or whether it marked a new departure in 
foreign affairs.”  The Prime Minister’s ability to describe the Grenada affair in the 
following weeks as an abnormality in US foreign policy, and not as a fundamental shift to 
a more belligerent, unilateral foreign policy, would determine the success or failure of the 
proposed INF deployment in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. 
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IV.  “THERE IS ROOM FOR TWO VIEWS ON THIS MATTER:” THE 
STATIONING OF INF IN BRITAIN 
 
No matter how effectively Britain managed its defence effort it was on the unity, strength 
and credibility of NATO that our security ultimately depended. 
- Margaret Thatcher231 
 
 The British government responded to America’s invasion of Grenada in 1983 
with incredulity and outrage.  In addition to Prime Minister Thatcher’s personal sting at 
being deceived and misinformed by her close ally President Reagan, her government 
faced ridicule in Parliament and the press for a complete misunderstanding of the 
American position on Grenada.  With growing public doubt within Britain surrounding 
the trustworthiness of the United States, Margaret Thatcher faced an obstacle to the 
linchpin of her defense policy: the stationing of American cruise missiles in the United 
Kingdom.   
As political scientist Paul Sharp argues, the foundation of the Anglo-American 
alliance in the post-war era was nuclear collaboration.232  Historian John Dumbrell 
agrees, describing Britain’s nuclear cooperation and intelligence sharing with the United 
States as “the essence and beating heart of the Cold War ‘special relationship.’”233  The 
United States shared intelligence and close communication with other NATO members, 
but the only country the US helped establish and maintain an independent nuclear 
deterrent of its own was the UK.  Nuclear policy provided the special aspect of Anglo-
American relations.  The Grenada conflict highlighted the danger posed “by the policies 
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of Britain’s great nuclear benefactor” to the continuation of Britain’s nuclear defense 
policy, and to Britain’s ability to maintain an independent foreign policy separate from 
that of the United States.234  For the British, Grenada represented a culmination of years 
of American international faux pas.  The American invasion revealed Reagan’s 
commitment to defeating the Soviet Union at all costs despite the international turmoil 
his actions might cause.  Britain’s ability to successfully deploy American cruise missiles 
following the Grenada crisis in turn revealed Thatcher’s seasoned statesmanship and her 
commitment to accomplish her foreign policy objectives through internationalism.  As 
was so often the case, American action in Grenada quickly became enmeshed in the 
wider East-West conflict and geopolitical posturing, while Grenada itself diminished 
rapidly into the background. 
In 1979, the British government faced a dilemma in its defense policy.  
Throughout the late 1970s, the Soviets had deployed their new SS-20 mobile ballistic 
missiles, an intermediate-range nuclear weapon, in Eastern Europe.  NATO had a long-
range nuclear deterrent in Western Europe via American Polaris missiles, but lacked a 
corresponding weapon system to the Soviets’ SS-20 missiles.  American cruise missiles 
appeared to offer a solution to this disparity.  While some argued that cruise missiles 
offered no greater deterrent than already possessed in long-range missiles, aircraft 
equipped with nuclear missiles, and nuclear submarines, Thatcher thought otherwise.  
According to the Prime Minister, “NATO’s strategy was based on having a range of 
conventional and nuclear weapons so that the USSR could never be confident of 
overcoming NATO at one level of weaponry without triggering a response at a higher 
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level leading ultimately to full-scale nuclear war.”235  Cruise missiles thus bridged the 
gap, in her view, between “the conventional and the strategic nuclear response.”236  
Cruise missiles represented half of the dual-track method of addressing the Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 missiles adopted in December 1979.  Negotiations would proceed 
alongside INF deployment to ensure that NATO negotiated from a position of strength on 
the issue of INF.  Thatcher believed “that NATO would have to go ahead with the 
decision to deploy theatre nuclear weapons or else the alliance would lose its credibility 
and its purpose.”237  Thus, for Margaret Thatcher’s government the proposed deployment 
of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) by NATO in Western Europe represented a 
crucial part of Britain’s defense policy and its role as trans-Atlantic mediator. 
The British government fully supported the United States’ leadership on the issue 
of modernizing NATO’s nuclear force in Europe to include INF.  In turn, the United 
States wanted Britain to help convince hesitant countries such as the Netherlands and 
West Germany to place new United States operated cruise missiles in their countries as a 
part of INF.  Throughout 1979 the British worked on this objective.  As Margaret 
Thatcher explained in a letter to President Carter, “I myself have talked about the plans at 
length recently with Prime Minister Cossiga and Chancellor Schmidt; Francis Pym has 
had special discussions with his German, Dutch, and Italian counterparts in the last 
fortnight; and Peter Carrington has raised the matter recently with Van der Klaauw and 
Frydenlund.”238 
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Margaret Thatcher placed great importance on the modernization of NATO’s INF 
in Europe for both strategic and political reasons, as would be seen again during the 
difficult days following the Grenada invasion.  In the same letter to President Carter, 
Thatcher explained that “the December decisions are… of crucial importance.  A set back 
could seriously damage the Alliance’s credibility and effectives.”239  Despite the Prime 
Minister’s apprehension, the decision to deploy 572 American cruise missiles in Western 
Europe received approval from NATO foreign ministers on 12 December 1979.  The 
scheduled deployment year for NATO’s INF was 1983.  The United States government 
immediately offered its thanks to Margaret Thatcher and the British government for their 
role in accomplishing the modernization agreement.  In a meeting between the Prime 
Minister and members of the US Congress on 17 December, Senator Frank Church (D-
ID), the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, acknowledged that the 
United States had been preoccupied by the Iranian hostage crisis and had leaned heavily 
on Britain for support in securing European agreement for nuclear modernization.240  
Other congressmen thanked the Prime Minister for her efforts to secure the release of the 
American hostages in Iran.  The United States government clearly recognized the 
important role Britain played in supporting US objectives in Europe.  Margaret Thatcher 
hoped this recognition would lead to a corresponding effort on the United States’ part to 
provide Britain with a strong position from which to negotiate with its European 
counterparts.  Grenada caused the Prime Minister enormous dissatisfaction in this regard. 
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 In the immediate run-up to the Grenada crisis, Britain’s government faced the 
daunting task of successfully deploying NATO’s INF in the UK, and also ensuring that 
its European counterparts followed through with the 1979 agreement.  The British 
recognized the benefits successfully deploying INF would bring Britain as well as the 
potential problems that would arise if the 1979 agreement were abandoned.  Thatcher 
stated that “if it [INF deployment] went ahead as planned, the Soviet Union would suffer 
a real defeat; if it was abandoned in response to the Soviet sponsored ‘peace offensive,’ 
there was a real danger of a decoupling of Europe and America.”241   The government 
understood that public opinion had to be carefully cultivated in order to ensure an orderly 
placement of US cruise missiles at Greenham Common in the UK.  Defense Secretary 
John Nott outlined the problems and opportunities the government faced in deploying 
cruise missiles in a minute prepared on 20 October 1982.  He stated that “there is… an 
unease about NATO’s nuclear strategy generally and a feeling that the Alliance places 
too much reliance on nuclear weapons, is unwilling to contemplate anything other than a 
growing nuclear stockpile, and attaches too little importance to disarmament.”242  He 
believed that the positions and statements made by the Reagan administration reinforced 
this attitude.  Nott also highlighted the more negative opinions the British public felt 
towards cruise missiles as opposed to American aircraft.  Many Britons worried that US 
missiles were more uncontrollable than US aircraft, and therefore posed a greater threat 
to the UK.  
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Nott offered several suggestions to alleviate public fears and quell potential 
opposition.  While cost prohibited the purchase of the cruise system from the United 
States, efforts could be made to highlight British participation in guarding and 
transporting the missiles, or the British government could reconsider the dual-key option 
for INF deployment, which would require two separate launch codes from the British and 
the Americans in order to launch a missile.  Overall, Nott encouraged the government to 
take more initiative on NATO’s arms control discussions with the Soviets, and make 
efforts to avoid being perceived as “the creature of the Americans.”243  The ultimate 
danger of losing the public’s support on cruise, Nott argued, was the potential loss of 
Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent (and thus a loss of the foundation of Britain’s 
post-war defense policy) due to public mistrust of both nuclear weapons and the 
American government which provided the systems necessary to deliver nuclear weapons.  
Additionally, to the British, the lack of “an independent nuclear deterrent, even if it was 
only an off-the-shelf version, meant accepting second-class status.”244  No elected British 
government was prepared to accept “second-class” status. 
The nuclear deterrent represented an important aspect of Britain’s relationship 
with Europe as well, as evidenced by Britain’s efforts in December 1979 to ensure 
European approval of INF deployment.  The widespread placement of nuclear weapons 
in countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands revealed 
a united front against any potential Soviet encroachment, and also lessened the risk of a 
potential first strike against the United Kingdom.  The UK also viewed its potential 
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leadership role in Europe as a sustaining factor in the Anglo-American relationship, 
despite the government’s difficulty in achieving any leadership role in Europe during the 
early 1980s.  The United States believed that Britain could encourage the rest of Europe 
to follow US leadership in NATO.  In a letter to Margaret Thatcher on 3 November 1982, 
Foreign Secretary Francis Pym highlighted this understanding between the United States 
and Britain as it pertained to INF.  Pym feared that public outcry and domestic political 
pressure in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands would complicate the 
INF deployment the following year.  He contended that “the Americans look to us for the 
lead that will encourage the others to overcome their own political difficulties.”245  
Thatcher also contended that it was “Britain’s task to put the American case [for INF] in 
Europe since we shared their analysis but tended to put it in less ideological language.”246  
In addition to “exaggerated American rhetoric,” Thatcher believed that “the perennial 
nervousness of European opinion threatened to undermine the good transatlantic 
relationship.”247  Thus, Margaret Thatcher clearly viewed her role as an intermediary 
between European timidity and American bellicosity, despite the doubts held by other 
European governments concerning Britain’s commitment to Europe. 
The British government’s ability to ensure the British and European deployments 
of the nuclear deterrent in 1983 relied in turn on America maintaining a positive 
reputation in international affairs.  As Thatcher stated, the deployment of cruise missiles 
“depended to a large degree on demonstrating that the United States could indeed be 
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relied upon as a trustworthy ally.”248  The pipeline embargo set a tone of anti-American 
opinion that only increased following the invasion of Grenada in October 1983.  
President Reagan’s decision to halt the sale of all American-made pipeline materials to 
the Soviet Union in December 1981 had worried his European allies who hoped to gain 
an affordable fuel source via the proposed Soviet natural gas pipeline.  When Reagan 
extended his embargo to American companies’ foreign subsidiaries in Europe, he 
exasperated his allies, including Margaret Thatcher.  Not only had the United States 
interfered in its allies’ independent economic decision making, it also had neglected to 
understand the financial and diplomatic impact its actions would have on its closest allies.  
While the United States viewed economic cooperation between NATO countries and the 
USSR as detrimental in times of intense East-West confrontation, the British viewed non-
military trade as “a way of easing international tension.”249  Additionally, the British “felt 
that the US, so comparatively self-sufficient and nondependent on trade, did not 
appreciate Britain’s needs.”250   
Thatcher recognized that Reagan was focused completely on defeating the Soviet 
Union, despite the cost that victory might impose on his allies.  While Thatcher supported 
the effort to vanquish the Soviet Union, she realized that continued unilateral action on 
the part of the Americans could break up the western alliance as its member states grew 
fearful of aggressive US leadership.  Margaret Thatcher’s internationalist perspective and 
her greater understanding of European alliance building (due to both failures and 
successes in this regard) allowed her to better gauge the effects unilateral American 
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action would have on the western alliance.  Thatcher knew that if the United States lost 
its allies’ trust, the planned deployment of NATO’s INF would fail.  No European 
country would base US operated cruise missiles within its borders if that country doubted 
the stability of the “finger on the trigger.”   
As a result, the issue that caused the most apprehension in the British government 
in the run-up to the INF’s deployment concerned the public perception of Britain’s 
control of the cruise missiles.  The foundation of the Anglo-American nuclear 
understanding was the Murphy-Dean Agreement of 1958, which established the 
guidelines of consultation between the US President and the British Prime Minister “to 
respond to a Soviet attack by committing nuclear retaliatory forces to the attack from the 
United Kingdom.”251  The Murphy-Dean Agreement determined that the decision to use 
nuclear weapons operated by the United States and based in the UK would “be a matter 
for joint decision by the two governments in light of the circumstances at the time.”252  
More specifically, “the ‘joint decision’ required by the basic understanding between both 
governments would be taken by the President and the Prime Minister, who would speak 
personally with each other.”253  However, as Secretary of the Cabinet Robert Armstrong 
reminded the Prime Minister in a letter on 11 November 1982, in a crisis situation the 
United Kingdom had “no physical control” of the American-operated missiles.254  
Therefore, an extraordinary level of trust had to exist between the two governments in 
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order to maintain the Murphy-Dean Agreement, and to convince the British public that 
consultation would be made prior to a UK-based nuclear strike.   
In order to assuage public fears that consultation alone was not strong enough to 
ensure America’s respect for British nuclear sovereignty, several ideas were floated to 
strengthen the government’s control over the decision to launch a nuclear strike.  The 
concept of a dual-key system had long provided an attractive solution to the problem of 
consultation.  Previously, at the Bermuda talks of 1957 between President Eisenhower 
and Prime Minister MacMillan, the United States had agreed to station Thor missiles in 
the United Kingdom with a dual-control launch mechanism.  In his address to the 
Commons on 1 April 1957, MacMillan addressed the issue of sovereignty and 
emphasized Britain’s final say on any decision to launch Thor missiles from British 
territory.  He stated that: 
They [Thor missiles] will be provided under an agreement the full details of 
which have still to be negotiated, but they will be the property of Her Majesty's 
Government, manned by British troops who will receive their prior training from 
American experts. The rockets cannot be fired by any except the British 
personnel, but the warhead will be in the control of the United States— which is 
the law of the United States— and to that extent the Americans have a negative 
control; but it is absolutely untrue to say that the President and not the British 
Government will decide when these missiles will be launched and at whom.255 
 
MacMillan understood that many in Britain doubted the reliability of consultation alone 
in ensuring British sovereignty over missiles based in the UK.  MacMillan’s use of dual-
control thus provided a precedent for both Members of Parliament and the public at large 
who believed that cruise missiles should also be subject to a dual-control system so as not 
to compromise British sovereignty. 
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The issue of dual control of cruise missiles received full attention in a paper 
prepared for Margaret Thatcher by Robert Armstrong.  He judged that in order “to gain 
an absolute physical veto on the release of weapons, it would be necessary to re-engineer 
and reprogramme the launch control system so that release of the weapon could only be 
effected once two separate ‘codes’ (one authorized by the US President, one by the Prime 
Minister) had been entered.”256  However, this solution would incur a huge financial cost 
to the nation.  Armstrong doubted the United States would fully fund and build the cruise 
missile systems and then allow the UK government to man the system alongside the US.  
Armstrong believed the US government would require the British government to fully 
man and fund the system if Britain demanded a physical dual key mechanism.  
Armstrong estimated the cost over ten years at one billion pounds.257 
In addition to the financial cost, demanding a dual-key control mechanism for the 
cruise missiles could potentially alienate the US government, and put the deployment of 
INF in Europe at risk.  The new Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine described the 
implications that calling for dual key would have on the Anglo-American relationship.  
He said that “any change now would be interpreted as reflecting a lack of trust on our 
part in the Americans with implications for Alliance credibility as a whole.”258  Francis 
Pym reiterated that “reopening the control issue… could only be interpreted publicly as a 
lack of confidence in the good faith and judgement of the US administration in time of 
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crisis.”259  Pym believed that if the British government, as America’s principal nuclear 
ally, called for greater control over US owned and operated weapons, the deployment of 
NATO’s INF would be greatly complicated, arousing the ire of the US government and 
endangering Britain’s foreign policy objectives.  In order to achieve its goals of 
countering the build-up of Soviet INF with a matched deployment of NATO’s INF, the 
British government had to support the United States fully, despite private misgivings.  
The danger dual control posed to European deployment originated in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, which had foresworn ever owning or operating nuclear weapons.  
Additionally, polls showed that stationing nuclear weapons operated by the Americans in 
West Germany was already unpopular.  In 1981, public opinion surveys revealed that “40 
percent of West Germans unconditionally opposed the stationing of U.S. missiles on their 
soil.”260  With a spring election looming in West Germany, any hint of dual control over 
NATO’s INF in Europe could cause the West German government to delay the 
deployment of American cruise missiles, or lead to a complete rethinking of West 
German deployment.261  As the British Ambassador to the USSR Iain Sutherland pointed 
out, failure to carry through NATO’s planned deployment of INF, or even rumors of such 
an occurrence could encourage the Soviet Union to halt the ongoing arms control talks in 
Geneva.  He believed that the Soviets “may well still hope that, at some stage between 
now and December, western public opinion will do their work for them and deliver into 
their hands decisions to cancel or at least restrict western deployment of cruise and 
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Pershing [missiles] which they would be unable to win at the negotiating table except in 
return for conditions with respect” to their own nuclear deterrent.262 
In fact, the Soviets did take a wait-and-see approach to the arms control 
negotiations as potential disagreements between Western European nations became 
apparent.  As US Secretary of State George Shultz explained, the Soviet aim in deploying 
their SS-20s “was to undermine Western Europe’s confidence in us.”263  Shultz believed 
that the Soviets sought to create an imbalance, seemingly saying that “we can hit the 
capitals of Europe from our soil, and we dare the United States to say that it would 
respond with a strategic nuclear strike, a nuclear exchange risking demolition of the 
United States itself.”264  Thus the Americans also recognized the danger to NATO and 
the western alliance if NATO failed to deploy INF.  Shultz feared that the Europeans 
might decide that “if they could not look to America to ensure their security, perhaps they 
should accommodate the Soviet Union’s wishes.”265  Clearly it was in the Soviets’ best 
interests to halt INF’s deployment.   
The question of INF deployment became a central issue in both the British and 
West German elections in 1983.  The Soviet Union funneled money into West German 
peace groups that supported the Social Democrat candidate Hans-Jochen Vogel, who 
promised to disallow INF deployment.  The Soviet government continued to make grave 
pronouncements for the prospects of peace if the planned placement of INF occurred.266  
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As a result of the political pressure in Western Europe and the UK, the British 
government refused to discuss the possibility of dual control outside of closed Cabinet 
sessions.  Eventually the government decided that the costs and risks posed by adopting 
dual control far outweighed the benefits, and implemented the deployment of INF as 
previously planned. 
The British government worked hard throughout 1982 and 1983 to ensure that 
public opinion of the Americans, and in particular President Reagan, remained high 
enough to ensure an orderly stationing of American cruise missiles in Britain and 
Western Europe.  The issue of the Siberian pipeline had finally been negotiated 
satisfactorily, and the scheduled deployment of cruise missiles was just weeks away 
when the United States invaded Grenada.267  As has been seen, the invasion shocked the 
British government.  While the lack of consultation taken before invading a 
Commonwealth member rankled many Tory and Labour MPs, the political timing of the 
invasion could not have been worse.  Margaret Thatcher’s party had just won an 
astounding victory in the 1983 General Election, but America’s seemingly rash action in 
Grenada threatened to severely deplete Thatcher’s political capital just months after the 
election.  As the Parliamentary debates and Cabinet sessions following the Grenada crisis 
reveal, the issue of American credibility and cruise placement quickly became the focal 
point of the entire Grenada episode.  
On 25 October, the day following the invasion, Denis Healey, Labour’s shadow 
foreign secretary, responded to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe’s explanation of 
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America’s invasion with particular vitriol.  He described the Americans as deceivers who 
had committed an “unpardonable humiliation of an ally.”268  He demanded that the 
British government publically condemn the US action.  Other Labour MPs questioned the 
supposed closeness of the Anglo-American alliance, and took lines similar to Healey’s.  
Many Tories, on the other hand, questioned the government on its unwillingness to join 
the Americans in freeing the Grenadian people from their oppressors.  Tory MP Peter 
Tapsell described the American action as “inevitable and desirable,” and questioned why 
those “who are for ever blathering on about the dangers posed by Soviet imperialism” 
opposed American intervention in Grenada.269  Tory MP Julian Amery brought the 
Commonwealth into the equation, asking why the British government had failed to 
support the nations of the Caribbean Commonwealth that had asked for assistance in 
removing the threat posed by an unstable, Marxist Grenada.  He believed the government 
would have shown true leadership and responsibility by inviting the Americans to lead 
the invasion of Grenada on behalf of the Caribbean Commonwealth.270 
 As the week wore on, it became apparent why the government took a middle 
position in response to the American invasion of Grenada.  A denunciation of the US by 
the British government would strengthen the anti-cruise movement, while supporting US 
action would give tacit approval to the low level of consultation taken prior to the 
invasion (about which Thatcher was most displeased), and open the government to 
condemnation from the British public and other European governments.  Denis Healey 
quickly jumped to the attack on 26 October by questioning what the government knew 
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about America’s plans and when they knew those plans.  He summed up his position by 
saying, “Either Her Majesty’s Government were deceived by their major ally, or Her 
Majesty’s Government were deceiving the House.”271  Healey’s criticisms quickly shifted 
from the government to the Prime Minister herself by stating that “the Prime Minister has 
made something of a cult of her special relationship with the American President at the 
expense of British interests” in the Commonwealth and Europe, and in so doing, Thatcher 
represented no more than “an obedient poodle to the American President.”272  While such 
personal attacks were common and lacked the power to persuade, Healey’s next line of 
attack presented a potential threat.  Healey ended his speech with a direct call for action: 
If events continue as now foreseen, the British Government must, at the very 
minimum, refuse to accept the deployment of American missiles on British soil 
unless Britain has the physical power to prevent the use of those missiles against 
her will. What has happened in Grenada must be a warning to the Secretary of 
State for Defence, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in that regard. 
We on this side of the House—and I believe many on the other side of the House 
— believe that America's action against Grenada was a catastrophic blunder and 
that the failure of Her Majesty's Government to prevent it was an unforgivable 
dereliction of duty. However, something at least may be gained from the 
experience of the past few days. This experience should warn America's allies of 
the danger of servility to a leadership from Washington which could be disastrous 
to the interests of the western world. It should remind all of America's allies of the 
need to unite to shift American policy to the ways of co-operation and common 
sense.273 
 
 On their own, the remarks of Healey, the newly-christened shadow Foreign 
Secretary of a party that had just been soundly defeated in a general election several 
months earlier, represented the same arguments used by Labour in that disastrous 1983 
election campaign.  However, his remarks this time mirrored public opinion.  The impact 
of American action in Grenada on British public opinion could be seen in poll changes 
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throughout 1983.  In January, the government faced an uphill struggle as a MORI poll 
reported that only 36% of the population supported stationing cruise missiles compared to 
54% who opposed cruise deployment.  The government successfully moved public 
opinion during the election campaign so that at the beginning of September 1983, 45% of 
the population supported cruise deployment while 44% of the population still opposed 
cruise placement.  This hard-earned public relations victory quickly vanished following 
America’s invasion of Grenada.  On 1 November, a week after the invasion, the majority 
of the public once again opposed the deployment of American cruise missiles with 50% 
of the population opposing and 38% supporting the decision.274   
Healey’s warning about “servility to a leadership from Washington” thus 
demonstrated the shifting perception of many European politicians who had begun “to 
see the United States as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution.”275  The 
Anglo-American alliance had long been the solution to Britain’s foreign policy strategies 
and objectives, but Reagan’s actions in Grenada and other Third World countries posed 
severe problems for the continuation of Anglo-American cooperation.  While Reagan 
viewed his intervention in Grenadian politics as a victory in the East-West struggle and a 
defense of American interests, many in Thatcher’s government worried his active foreign 
policy would “sour the possibilities for an accord with Moscow and exacerbate tensions 
that might otherwise be reduced.”276 
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 The British government viewed American action as rash and shortsighted.  As has 
been seen, shortly before the conflict began Britain repeatedly warned the American 
government against intervening in Grenada’s affairs.  While the government hedged its 
public criticism of America’s action, the Cabinet sessions were filled with 
disappointment and incredulity at the lack of consultation taken by the US prior to their 
decision. Most discussions focused on damage control.  In a session on 27 October 1983, 
the Cabinet recognized that Grenada’s independent status precluded the need for the US 
“to seek British advice, or to accept it if sought.”277  Additionally the Cabinet decided 
that public condemnation was inappropriate due to the close relationship between Britain 
and the United States.  Thatcher insisted that “Britain’s friendship with the United States 
must on no account be jeopardized.”278 The government had been placed in a bind.  The 
United States represented the linchpin of Britain’s foreign policy and therefore could not 
be criticized publically, but a failure to adequately defend Britain’s position opened the 
government to further accusations of being “Reagan’s poodle.”  Ultimately, as Thatcher 
noted in her memoirs, the British government was forced “to defend the United States’ 
reputation in the face of widespread condemnation.”279  
 In the Cabinet meeting on 3 November, attention remained focused on why the 
US failed to adequately consult Britain, and how Britain’s failure to support US action in 
Grenada was perceived by the US administration.  Foreign Secretary Howe explained 
that “the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, had expressed regret to him at the 
United States government’s failure to consult the British government earlier about 
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American plans to intervene in Grenada.  The failure had been due largely to [the 
administration’s] preoccupation with the terrorist attack on the United States force in 
Lebanon on 23 October.”280  James Prior, the Secretary for Northern Ireland, travelled to 
the United States following the invasion.  He expressed his opinion that “the close 
relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom did not appear to have 
been seriously damaged by the difference of view between the two Governments over 
Grenada.”  However, some in the US administration questioned Britain’s unwillingness 
to support US action in Grenada after the United States had supported Britain’s action in 
the Falklands the previous year.   
John Dumbrell argues that American and British perceptions of the Grenada affair 
were “deeply affected by the Falklands conflict.”281  The Americans believed they were 
acting in their own self-interest by invading Grenada, preventing both the rise of a new 
Soviet-backed enemy in the Western Hemisphere and a potential large-scale hostage 
crisis, and thus expected that “Britain was unlikely to protest any American activism in 
the Western hemisphere.”282  US Secretary of State Shultz felt annoyed by Thatcher’s 
sense of outrage.  He stated that “we had turned ourselves into pretzels for Mrs. Thatcher 
over the Falklands crisis.”283  However, the two events were vastly different, and were 
perceived as such by the Thatcher government.  Argentina invaded sovereign British 
territory in the Falklands, while in Grenada, a Marxist coup overthrew a government 
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founded by an earlier Marxist coup.  The British, not overjoyed at the extent of US 
cooperation during the Falklands War, continued to face diplomatic difficulties over 
America’s relationship with Argentina. 
 In the aftermath of Grenada, the British government continued to support the 
United States administration, but the United States seemed poised to offend British 
sentiments once again through its foreign policy with Argentina.  Thatcher had instructed 
the British ambassador to the UN to abstain from voting on a resolution tabled by 
Guyana, which condemned US action in Grenada.  The government hoped that abstaining 
would encourage the United States government “to abstain on the Argentine-sponsored 
resolution about the Falkland Islands, for which they were likely to vote in favor.”284  
Also, the US government planned to resume arms sales to Argentina “despite the further 
adverse consequences this was bound to have for the United States/United Kingdom 
relationship in the aftermath of Grenada.”285  The Cabinet concluded on 10 November 
that “an American decision to resume arms sales to Argentina would have a damaging 
effect on British opinion in the context of Cruise missile deployment.”286  As hard as the 
British government was working to convince the British public that America could still 
be trusted, the United States seemed to continuously ignore the impact its decisions were 
having on the British government. 
 The British government’s exasperation with the United States government was 
displayed during a meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth Dam on 7 November.  The Prime Minister pointed to Britain’s decision to 
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abstain from voting on the UN resolution condemning US action in Grenada, and asked 
why the United States planned on voting with Argentina instead of with the UK in the 
United Nations General Assembly.  Additionally, Thatcher predicted that US armament 
of Argentina “would be seen as having one purpose – to build up the Argentine potential 
to fight the United Kingdom.”287  If the United States armed the Argentineans, Thatcher 
“would have to be vigorously critical – and the decision could have other repercussions 
on public opinion.”  Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Howe reiterated that both the 
disagreements over Grenada and the United States’ Argentinean policy “tended to have 
implications for co-operation on defence and INF.”   
Despite these grave pronouncements from Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe, Dam 
insisted that the US government would support the Argentinean resolution in the General 
Assembly that expressed regret over Britain’s refusal to negotiate the issue of the 
Falklands sovereignty with the Argentine government and requested that negotiations be 
renewed.288  Thatcher, recognizing her inability to change US policy concerning the 
resolution, attempted to win her second point by saying that of the two policy decisions, 
“the US supply of arms to Argentina would be infinitely more serious.”289  Dam 
dismissed Thatcher’s fears by pointing out that the United States only planned on 
recertifying the Argentinean government to receive US arms.  Additionally, Dam 
believed “that some relationship between the United States and the Argentine military 
was in the long term desirable for democracy in Argentina.”  Howe, again understanding 
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the inability of the British to dissuade American foreign policy, asked the Deputy 
Secretary of State to at least consider “that the further certification could be distanced 
from the Grenada events the better.”  He realized that additional public disagreements 
between the US and UK coming so quickly after the invasion would increase doubts 
about the British government’s close relationship with the US, and the United States’ 
willingness to honor its pledge to consult the British government prior to a nuclear strike 
launched from the UK. 
Thatcher also asked for consultation over what types of weapons the Americans 
proposed to sell to the Argentinean government.  While Dam avoided agreeing to 
consultation over the arms negotiations, he reminded the Prime Minister that only the 
presidential administration could approve an arms sale.  This failed to comfort Margaret 
Thatcher, who said “that following recent events we would have to be very sure that no 
administration decision had been taken.”290  The meeting concluded without the British 
government significantly shifting the US administration’s foreign policy direction to 
better match Britain’s desired foreign policy objectives. 
 During the government’s deliberations on how to ensure a situation like Grenada 
would not rise again between Britain and the United States, pressure continued to mount 
within Parliament and the public to halt the deployment of cruise missiles.  Prior to the 
Grenada crisis, several groups already opposed the placement of American missiles in the 
UK.  The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) worked with the Greenham 
Common Women’s Peace Camp movement to shift public opinion against the INF 
deployment.  On 1 April 1983, the two groups joined together to form a 40,000-person 
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strong human chain stretching from Greenham Common in Berkshire (the proposed 
cruise missile site) to the Royal Ordnance Factory in Burghfield.  This demonstration 
represented the largest protest the CND ever held outside of London.291  Following the 
American invasion of Grenada, the CND and Greenham women protestors increased their 
efforts to sway public opinion.   
Reporter Denis Hackett observed that many protestors worried about further 
unilateral American action.  While Reagan had claimed that neither Britain nor the 
United States would act independently of the other on nuclear issues, the American 
invasion of Grenada cast doubt on his assertion.292  Speaking in support of the protestors, 
Labour MP Anthony Wedgwood Benn stated “that Reagan will not consult Mrs. Thatcher 
before the cruise missiles are used.”293  He believed that “there was now a genuine fear 
that Britain could be destroyed ‘as a by-product of an adventurous American policy 
which we oppose.’”  Britain would be targeted by the Soviets “even if we opposed US 
policy” due to the presence of US cruise missiles.294  On the weekend following 
America’s invasion of Grenada, hundreds of women protestors cut through the fence 
surrounding Greenham Common and dashed paint on the runway in an effort to keep 
American planes carrying cruise missiles from landing. Security increased at the air base 
following the incursions, and one hundred and eighty seven women were arrested for 
cutting through the fence over the weekend of the 29-30 October.  In London on the 31 
October, several hundred protestors gathered in Trafalgar Square and “vented their anger 
                                                291	  Nicholas	  Timmins,	  “Thousands	  of	  hands	  link	  in	  CND	  rally,”	  The	  Times,	  2	  Apr	  1983,	  pg.	  1.	  	  
292 Denis Hackett, “Cruising into controversy,” The Times, 28 Oct 1983, pg. 7.  293	  “More Greenham arrests after second attack,” The Times, 31 Oct 1983, pg. 24.	  
294 “More Greenham arrests after second attack,” The Times, 31 Oct 1983, pg. 24. 
 101 
at the imminent arrival of cruise missiles.”295  This formed part of a last minute effort to 
dissuade Parliament from reaffirming the 1979 NATO decision to deploy the cruise 
missiles at Greenham Common. 
On 31 October, the final debate on the stationing of cruise missiles was held in 
Parliament.  The Secretary of State for Defence Michael Heseltine defended the 
government’s position against opposition from both the Liberal and Labour party leaders.  
David Steel, leader of the Liberal party, introduced an amendment calling for dual control 
of the cruise missiles.  After debate, the amendment gained little support, going down in 
defeat 360 to 22.  The Labour party opposed the deployment of any cruise missiles in the 
UK, dual-key or otherwise.  Michael Heseltine argued that while the current government 
had approved the decision in 1979 to deploy American cruise missiles in the UK, “the 
evidence is overwhelming that the last Labour government was deeply involved in the 
discussions and accepted the need for that decision when six months after the 1979 
general election we took it.”296 
Denis Healey responded that “after Grenada Britain could no longer be satisfied 
with the present arrangements.”  Healey believed the danger posed by United States’ 
cruise missiles based in the UK had been seen “last week [as] the United States brushed 
the United Kingdom aside when the threat was vague and distant.”  How could “the 
Prime Minister really believe the United States administration, certainly under this 
President, would take any notice when the threat was to thousands of American soldiers 
in Europe?”  After all, the core of Reagan’s argument that the Grenada invasion had been 
                                                295	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legal was the danger posed to approximately 1,000 US medical students.  Healey, for one, 
believed the United States would not hesitate to defend its troops from any perceived 
threat despite British objections.  Ultimately Healey’s objections failed to influence 
enough Conservative MPs to vote against the government, and the reaffirmation of the 
1979 NATO agreement passed 362 to 218.297  
On 2 November, Secretary of State for Defence Michael Heseltine warned 
potential demonstrators that any infiltrators who approached the missile bunkers within 
Greenham Common could be shot.  Heseltine argued that the danger posed by terrorists 
using the demonstrators as a cover could not be ignored, but this proclamation further 
heightened the intense rhetoric involved in the cruise deployment.  The chairman of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Joan Ruddock, said Heseltine’s statement illustrated 
“the extreme lengths to which this Government is prepared to go to implement a policy 
which is clearly unpopular with the British people.”298  The first cruise missiles began 
arriving in the UK on 14 November 1983.  In response Labour leader Neil Kinnock 
warned “the Prime Minister that the British people will not forgive her for allowing first-
use nuclear weapons to be deployed in Britain, especially when the American 
Government which owns and controls those weapons has so recently and so obviously 
shown its contempt for the views of the British Government.”299 
The British government successfully deployed American cruise missiles in 
November 1983 despite the difficulties posed by American action in Grenada.  
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Thatcher’s intense disagreement with Reagan over Grenada largely dealt with the 
invasion’s timing.  The Americans failed to consider the problems their action would 
cause for NATO’s planned INF deployment, which was to take place within a month of 
their assault on Grenada.  Thatcher’s support of American military action in El Salvador 
and Nicaragua, examples of US military intervention in independent countries facing 
internal strife, leads one to believe that her anger at America’s invasion of Grenada 
would have been less severe if it had occurred at another time.   
While any unilateral military action taken by the United States so close to INF’s 
deployment would have caused problems for Thatcher’s government, the invasion of a 
Commonwealth nation exacerbated the problem.  The British government consistently 
reminded Parliament of Grenada’s complete independence from the UK, but many MPs 
believed that Britain still maintained some level of responsibility for maintaining 
Grenada’s independence and well being.  Additionally, as the Parliamentary debates 
reveal, many MPs equated American action in Grenada with the proposed cruise 
deployment in the UK.  These MPs and others thought that if the US would not 
adequately consult the British government over its proposed plans for a Commonwealth 
country, how could it be trusted to consult the British government on cruise issues, 
especially if American interests varied with British interests?  While making the 
correlation between Grenada and cruise was a stretch, it played well in the press and 
confirmed the reservations held by many British citizens concerning the placement of 
American-operated cruise missiles in the UK.  The episode reveals that despite the British 
government’s best efforts, the government’s ability to shift America’s foreign policy to 
match its own only existed on a situational basis.  If Britain’s foreign policy strategy 
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failed to match up to the United States’ strategy, the British experienced a much more 
difficult time achieving their goals.  The Grenada crisis thus represents an opportunity to 
study both Britain’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy separate from the 
United States, as well as the two countries’ understanding of the Anglo-American 
alliance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Political scientist Paul Sharp has praised Margaret Thatcher for maintaining an 
independent foreign policy during her time as Prime Minister.  While some Labour MPs 
in Parliament believed that Thatcher represented no more than “Reagan’s poodle,” Sharp 
believes that “she identified the U.S. as the primary upholder of an international order 
which was good, from which Britain benefited greatly and which, hence, it had an 
obligation to help maintain.”300  Through this framework, Thatcher’s acceptance of 
repeated American slights did not reveal Britain’s weakness or servitude, but a strategic 
understanding that Britain could only remain great if the United States remained great. 
Thatcher’s belief that a successful British foreign policy depended on a strong and 
active United States presence in foreign affairs is evident in her memoirs.  She described 
the United States in 1979 as continuing to suffer from the ‘Vietnam syndrome,’ a 
“conviction that the United States was fortunately incapable of intervention abroad since 
such intervention would almost certainly be inimical to morality, the world’s poor, or the 
revolutionary tides of history.”301  In Thatcher’s view, this debilitating psychology 
produced a weak foreign policy and limited international presence that allowed the 
Soviets to invade Afghanistan, deploy new nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe, and build 
“its conventional forces to levels far in excess of NATO equivalents” without a strong 
American response other than the boycott of the 1980 Olympic games.302  Britain needed 
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a strong American government to counter the Soviets in Europe, and to keep Western 
Europe united in NATO.   
Thatcher believed that “nations must co-operate in defense of agreed international 
rules if they are either to resist great evils or to achieve great benefits.”303  This 
internationalism must be based on strong individual nation-states “which are able to call 
upon the loyalty of their citizens to defend and enforce civilized rules of international 
conduct.”304  Any international organization that tried to diminish the importance of the 
nation state would fail as “very few people [would be] prepared to make genuine 
sacrifices for it.”305  The United States, unlike the Soviet Union, enabled the states of 
Western Europe to maintain distinct identities and foreign policies while still playing the 
part of their primary defender and benefactor. 
However, the United States’ foreign policy throughout 1982 and 1983 was a 
policy of dictation rather than real consultation and negotiations with its Western 
European allies, Britain in particular.  Thatcher believed that American interference in 
European economies during the pipeline embargo and its invasion of Grenada in 1983 
caused many in Europe and the UK to believe fully in her version of the ‘Vietnam 
syndrome,’ viewing any American diplomatic interference as unhelpful.  Thatcher 
recognized the danger Reagan’s actions posed to NATO’s unity and continued existence.  
The United States risked looking overbearing and aggressive, usually traits assigned to 
the Soviet Union, on the world stage.  Reagan, entirely focused on defeating Communism 
around the world, could not pass up an opportunity to quickly end a Marxist regime in the 
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Caribbean.  For the American government, the long-term benefits to both the Grenadian 
people and the United States outweighed the offended sensibilities of the British.  As one 
of two superpowers in the world, the United States could afford to offend its allies at 
times.  Thatcher’s experience as the leader of a “middle-ranking power” caused her to 
understand alliance diplomacy in a completely different context.   
US Secretary of State George Shultz demonstrated the difference in British and 
American views of international diplomacy through his failure to understand why 
Thatcher opposed US action in Grenada.  He speculated that her rough session in the 
Commons, being labeled “Reagan’s poodle,” and her government’s misstatements on the 
likelihood of an American invasion of Grenada had highly embarrassed her.  
Additionally, “she may also have had a special sensitivity about a former British colony 
‘going bad’ and the Yanks having to go in there and clean up the mess.”306  While the 
British may have underestimated the impact the memory of the Iranian hostage crisis had 
on Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada, the Americans also misunderstood the impact 
their invasion of Grenada would have on British and European efforts to deploy INF.  In 
his memoirs, Shultz later admits that “there was a real chance that demonstrations could 
break the will of allied governments and prevent deployment – or at least pressure NATO 
so severely as to undermine our resolve to stand up to the Soviets in the future.”307  His 
inability to understand the increased likelihood of protests and efforts to stop the British 
government’s deployment of INF following America’s unilateral decision to invade 
Grenada further demonstrates the difference between how a superpower and a “middle-
ranking power” understood alliance diplomacy during the Cold War.   
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Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick, certainly no Anglophile, acknowledged 
America’s shortcomings in international diplomacy during this era, specifically at the 
UN, in a speech to the Heritage Foundation on 7 June 1982.  She believed America’s 
failure to accomplish its policy goals at the UN was “a direct reflection of what has been 
a persisting U.S. ineptitude in international relations that has dogged us all our national 
life,” and “is especially manifest in our multilateral politics.”308  While the United States 
often acted unilaterally or resorted to arm twisting in its foreign policy, the British 
constantly relied on the support of the United States government and Britain’s other allies 
in order to accomplish its goals.  The British thrived in a multilateral diplomatic arena 
such as the UN or NATO, as noted by Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s description of their 
efforts during the Falkland’s crisis: “They have made the organization [UN] function in 
ways that are responsive to their interests and their policy goals, and the fact that they 
were able to do it means it can be done.”309  The United States, on the other hand, 
struggled to achieve its goals in such an environment. 
The Grenada conflict thus reveals both Thatcher’s belief in the importance of a 
strong internationalism in order to accomplish Britain’s foreign policy goals, and the 
reason for this belief: Britain’s inability to accomplish its foreign policy objectives 
without international assistance.  While the Americans and Soviets could act unilaterally 
on the world’s stage and remain largely unaffected by the resulting diplomatic backlash, 
Britain relied on American assistance to provide its nuclear deterrent and European 
cooperation in deploying this deterrent.  Unfortunately for the Thatcher government, the 
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conflict in Grenada caused both the Europeans and the British public to doubt America’s 
ability to act within the bounds of international law and to adequately consult with its 
allies on important issues.  Any country unafraid to act boldly and unilaterally posed a 
threat to international stability.310   
American action in Grenada thus represented an affront to Margaret Thatcher’s 
core understanding of how foreign relations and the Anglo-American alliance should 
function.  Instead of the United States facilitating the deployment of INF in Europe, the 
Americans continued to hinder the deployment process through their unilateral and 
unpredictable decision-making.  Despite the headaches caused by American action in 
Grenada and elsewhere, the British successfully deployed American cruise missiles in the 
UK, and also encouraged its European allies to maintain their prior commitment to 
deploy cruise missiles.  However, the situation could have been much different without 
the steady hand of a devout internationalist like Thatcher bridging the gap between 
American belligerency and European doubt.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                310	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  action.	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